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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
After witnessing the success of Canadian strategies to attract U.S. film production in the 
1990s, states and localities began offering financial incentives in an effort to lure film and video 
production away from their traditional hubs in California and New York (Christopherson & Rightor, 
2010). This effort increased dramatically in the 2000s, both in scope and in scale. Production activity 
can now locate in states offering rebates of up to 40 percent of costs, even if this exceeds their actual 
tax bills, and all but a handful of states offer some form of tax incentives (Christopherson & Rightor, 
2010; Katz & Rosenthal, 2006; National Conference of State Legislatures, 2011; Vock, 2008). While 
some states may be reducing incentive packages in the current climate of fiscal austerity, others are 
doubling down on that strategy as an effort to stimulate job growth and increased economic activity. 
And while most states tout many successes from these programs in both metrics, the question of 
whether such policies promote long-term sustainable economic development has not been fully 
answered. 
First I use theoretical literature to construct a model of sustainable industrial development. I 
will then test this model using a variety of methods and data sets at the national, and state and county 
levels. In the following two analytical chapters, I will evaluate the impacts of incentives on state-
level employment and firm growth, followed by an assessment of the economic effects of incentives 
in one such state: Georgia. By using this variety of approaches and units of analysis, I hope to shed 
light on both the macro- and micro-level impacts such incentives have on the industrial economic 
development of states. 
In the first study, I use data from the County Business Patterns (CBP) over the years 2002-
2013 to view changes in economic activity by state by the level of incentives offered. Using panel 
 x 
data for industry employment, establishment and occupational employment, I use a fixed and 
random effects regression models to view the relationship between the presence of incentives and the 
levels of employment and firms in the film industry of each state.  
Next, I use Georgia as a case study with which to evaluate the degree to which financial 
incentives for the motion picture industry can create a sustainable network of local firms and 
workers. I test these theories by using confidential QCEW data to analyze establishment-level 
activity and relative locations. 
The results neither completely confirm nor disprove the hypothesis that attracting mobile 
productions with state tax incentives can establish a nascent industry and generate long-term 
employment in a region. However, there is some evidence that the number of years the MPIs are in 
effect does have a positive impact, especially on establishments and occupations. Additionally, the 
states’ climate and transportation access relative to Los Angeles and other locations are important 
factors in building a local industry. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This document is a dissertation consisting of two related studies on the industrial impacts of 
motion picture tax incentives. Each has its own research questions and hypotheses, and represents a 
unique methodological approach and scale of inquiry. They are unified, however, in developing a 
multifaceted understanding of the use of movie production incentives (MPIs) by U.S. states and their 
impacts on developing a film industry cluster within their jurisdictions. 
1.1 Entertainment Clusters and the Movie Production Incentive 
Much attention has been given to the attraction of film and other entertainment industrial 
clusters as a means to local economic development. To this end, policymakers at the state and local 
level have used traditional and non-traditional attraction strategies, including most significantly, tax 
credits and other financial incentives (Christopherson & Rightor, 2010; Markusen & Nesse, 2007). 
Understanding the efficacy of such strategies is especially important in the current climate of 
fiscal constraints on state and local governments. In Georgia alone, according to a recent report by 
the Georgia State University Fiscal Research Center, the incentives are estimated to reduce revenues 
by as much as $89 million by Fiscal Year 2012 (Fiscal Research Center, 2010). The two studies that 
follow will seek to describe and evaluate movie production incentives and their impact on the 
growth and concentration of the motion picture industry in the U.S. 
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1.2 Problem Statement and Research Questions 
The studies to be included in this dissertation all seek to explore a few fundamental 
questions, in addition to questions unique to each essay. At the broadest level I wish to address the 
question of whether industry incentives are effective in creating and growing an industry cluster. 
There is a large body of literature on this question developed over the last twenty years, but the 
results have been less than conclusive, and such incentives continue to be widely used by 
policymakers at the state and local level. I am particularly interested in the impact of incentives on 
building a sustainable industry, meaning one that can be weaned off of the support of public 
subsidies in a reasonable amount of time. This question has received somewhat less attention, and I 
hope to add to that body of literature. 
Secondarily, I hope to shed some light on the impacts of incentives on specific types of 
industries, especially creative industries. The creative industries have been the target of many 
economic development efforts in recent years, and the targeted recipient of a recent resurgence in 
industry incentives at the state level. These industries have unique features that may suggest that 
incentives might work differently for them than for other sectors such as manufacturing. I hope to 
parse out the similarities and differences between the impacts of incentives on creative industries 
relative to other industries, and how those differences might change the effectiveness of public 
assistance. Using the film and televising industries as an example, the key differences I will explore 
are 1) the unique labor organization of creative industries, 2) the project-based production process, 
3) the especially footloose” nature of creative production, and the need for specialized infrastructure. 
I will further consider questions about the scope and scale of state incentives for the film 
industry, the effectiveness of incentives when states are competing for the same industries, and 
importance of social networks in the development of a targeted creative industry cluster. 
  3 
1.3 The Organization of this Dissertation 
The following is a brief description of each major section of this dissertation. 
1.3.1 Theoretical Foundation and Literature 
The theoretical foundation for the essays is set in the broader literature around the 
mechanisms for economic development policies. I will consider the existing theoretical approaches, 
and attempt to develop a theoretical model specific to the creative industries. 
Three theoretical frameworks—growth-pole/cumulative causation theory, product cycle 
theory, and entrepreneurship theory—inform the concept of industrial clusters and the stages of 
economic development for which it might be utilized. A combination of these traditional and modern 
theories of regional economic development have been used to justify attraction policies such as tax 
credits and infrastructure development, which suggest a “stage theory” of industry development in 
which these policies eventually lead to a self-sustaining competitive industry cluster (Christopherson 
& Rightor, 2010).  
Another important theoretical foundation for my work is found in the social networks 
literature. I will explore this theory in particular in my third essay, and it will serve as a critical part 
of the theory I am developing on the growth of creative industries.  
I will then review the literature important to the general questions to be addressed in this 
dissertation. The areas of literature to be discussed will be that of general industry incentives, 
industrial clusters and regional development, the organization and development of the motion picture 
industry, and the effectiveness of motion picture incentives specifically. And finally, I will outline a 
theory on the growth and sustainability of creative industries, show the logic model with which it 
might function, and the ways it can be tested. 
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1.3.2 National overview 
The first of the two studies will investigate the scale and scope of MPIs in the national 
context. In it I will seek to identify the types of MPIs used by states since they first came to 
prominence in the early 2000s, and to show the changing economic geography of the industry during 
that period. 
1.3.3 State-level sustainability 
The second study will take an in-depth look at a single state, Georgia, and how its indigenous 
film cluster has developed since MPIs were introduced in 2005. For this essay I will be especially 
interested in looking at the six criteria put forth by Christopherson and Rightor (2010) as necessary 
for the development of a local industry using a combination of standardized census data, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Covered Employment Where Wages (CEW) data, and data collected from IMDb Pro 
(IMDb Pro, 2011), the subscriber version of the popular movie information service, and the Georgia 
Film, Video & Digital Entertainment Sourcebook (Georgia Department of Economic Development, 
2012). 
1.3.4 Conclusions 
Finally, I will use the findings from the two studies to evaluate the national picture outlined 
in the first study. Then I will use this analysis to discuss the key policy implications that these 
findings suggest, as well as the possibilities for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND LITERATURE 
 
 
 
The theoretical basis for these attraction strategies brings together components of several 
traditional and more contemporary theories of regional economic development: location theories 
(comprised themselves of growth-pole and cumulative causation theories), the product-cycle theory, 
and entrepreneurship theories (Blakely & Leigh, 2009; Malizia & Feser, 1999), with the relatively 
recent social network theory of economic development. 
In attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of MPIs, I bring together three streams of 
literature. First, I consider the literature on industry incentives in general, especially those dealing 
with tax incentives, which attempt to evaluate their effect on industry location decisions, 
employment growth, economic welfare and efficiency. Second, I look at the literature around the 
analysis of industry clusters and their role in regional economic development. And finally, I bring 
these two together with the literature on the unique nature of the motion picture industry. 
The cumulative causation and entrepreneurship theories explain how regions can gain a 
competitive advantage in economic development, while the growth-pole and product-cycle theories 
focus on the specific industries targeted. The competitive advantage in this case derives from 
combining an entrepreneurial environment with increased agglomeration within the industry sector.1 
Entertainment industries are considered here because they are growing industries with innovative 
products. I will focus here on only the theories related to regional advantage. 
These theories conclude, therefore, that attracting entertainment industries will lead to 
sustainable long-term employment growth. One challenge unique to these industries, however, is the 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed explication of these theories, see Malizia & Feser (1999) and Blakely & Leigh (2009, pp. 76-98) 
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mobile nature of film and entertainment production. This mobility leads to both short-term projects 
spending and fierce competition between state and municipal entities. One theory as to why financial 
incentives work, despite this mobility, is that local networks of qualified workers are built up over 
time, and become an attracting force for more production (Christopherson & Rightor, 2010; 
Weinstein & Clower, 2000). These local networks attract production in two ways: by offering 
mobile productions a qualified, stable crew base that doesn’t need to be imported to the production 
site, and by creating contacts leading to bringing and basing production in the area. In the following 
section, I will briefly describe each or these theories, and why none fully explain the phenomena of 
entertainment industry-based economic growth. By exploring the social network theory more closely 
I hope to pull together these various strains of theory into a single cohesive of development for 
creative industries. 
2.1 Economic Development Theories 
2.1.1 Growth-Pole and Cumulative Causation Theories 
Growth-pole and cumulative causation theories both share the common component of spatial 
disparity in economic development, though the mechanism behind such disparities differs somewhat. 
The rationale for growth-pole theory is based in four strategies: a focus on specific locations in 
limited periods of time, a limited number of such locations, selectivity among spaces based on pre-
ordained criteria, and the modification of the spatial structure of both labor and the population (Parr, 
1999). In contrast, the logic behind cumulative causation based on the endogeneity of technology to 
growth and the dynamic externalities associated with that growth, including specialization, diversity, 
and knowledge spillovers (Choi, 2003). Areas that are successful in attracting capital because of 
some competitive advantage tend to draw human and physical capital from less-advantaged areas, 
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leading to increased inequality between these locations (Blakely & Leigh, 2009). This creates a self-
reinforcing cycle, as advantaged areas gain and disadvantaged areas lose in the competition for 
capital. These advantages also contribute to innovation, and ultimately, more economic growth. 
2.1.2 Product Cycle Theory and Entrepreneurship Theory 
The product cycle theory of economic development, sometimes referred to as industrial 
filtering (Blair & Premus, 1993) focuses on the outputs of the industries of interest. The theory is 
relatively straightforward, in that growth is a direct result of innovation, therefore policy to 
encourage innovation, especially in early-stage products in growth industries, is where the value 
proposition is found (Blakely & Leigh, 2009). New products require highly skilled entrepreneurs and 
designers, constant market feedback and flexible production facilities, all of which lead to locations 
providing this mix of resources and risk minimization (Goldstein & Luger, 1993). Markusen and 
McCurdy point out, however, that innovation alone is insufficient for growth (1989). In their case 
study of the defense industry in Chicago, they demonstrate that other factors, most notably the lack 
of a critical mass for specialized firms and labor, have caused policies designed to attract such 
industries to fail. 
Finally, the entrepreneurship theory relates to these theories, especially the product cycle 
theory, because an environment attractive to entrepreneurship is considered necessary for innovation 
(Goldstein & Luger, 1993; Malizia & Feser, 1999). Therefore, communities are encouraged to create 
conditions leading to a critical mass of entrepreneurs, and that these entrepreneurial ventures can 
survive through their early stages to become viable enterprises in the long run (Goldstein & Luger, 
1993). Space is an important factor here, because firms whose networks are beyond the metropolitan 
region, the tendency for leakage is greatly increased (Goldstein & Luger, 1993). Locations can enact 
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policies which create and/or strengthen “knowledge networks” that will in turn attract more 
entrepreneurs to that locality (Blakely & Leigh, 2009). 
2.2 Industry clusters and regional development 
Michael Porter, largely acknowledged as the originator of the concept of industrial clusters, 
defined them as a geographic concentration of related firms, suppliers, customers, and supporting 
institutions that both compete and cooperate (Blair & Carroll, 2009; Motoyama, 2008; Porter, 1998). 
These firms gain competitive advantage precisely because of their colocation based on 
agglomeration effects, industrial complex effects, and social network effects (McCann, 2009)2. This 
theory has led to cluster-based economic development (CBED), which uses the competitive 
advantage industrial clusters represent to develop a pro-active strategy for attracting and growing 
competitive industrial clusters (Blair & Carroll, 2009). One problem with this approach, however, is 
that it uses existing clusters as models, and these are often already located in economically 
advantaged areas, making replication without detailed comparative analysis difficult if not highly 
unlikely (Perry, 2009). Other issues with CBED are the lack of explanatory data for how clusters 
form (i.e., go from a smattering of similar firms to being a functioning cluster), at least some of the 
advantages of clusters conflict with each other (e.g., competing clusters can diminish the competitive 
advantages of each), and it doesn’t allow for the majority of industries for whom cluster 
development seems unnecessary (Perry, 2009). 
Cluster-based economic development has led to industry targeting, which Voytek and 
Ledebur point out can be problematic as well. They note that we still know too little about location 
decisions for non-manufacturing sectors for CBED to work, about how to integrate this strategy into 
                                                 
2 This section was largely based on three summaries of cluster theory by Blair (Blair & Carroll, 2009), McCann (2009), 
Motoyama (2008), and Perry (2009). 
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comprehensive economic development plans, the techniques to use one targeted industries are 
identified, nor the expertise, talent, experience and knowledge to implement effective targeting 
strategies (Voytek & Ledebur, 1997). Others argue that targeting is still beneficial despite these 
limitations (Iannone, 1997). 
2.3 Social Networks, Social Capital, and their Roles in Creative Industries 
The theories outlined above, when taken together, suggest the importance of colocation of 
related firms and industries in a centralized space. The relationships between these firms create a 
“stickiness” or “embeddedness” that may contribute to resilience and long-term sustainable growth 
(Malizia & Feser, 1999). In the next section, I look at how networks of firms and individuals might 
affect the success of the local economy, and the mechanisms by which this might play out. 
2.3.1 Social Networks and the Social Capital Theory 
The concept and analysis of social networks comes from the sociology literature, where the 
social capital theory was largely developed by Bourdieu, Jacobs, and others, and more recently 
expanded by Granovetter, Coleman, Putnam and others (Woolcock, 1998).  
These theories from sociology were applied to economic theory by Granovetter (1973, 1983, 
1985), and later by Florida (Florida, 2012), to suggest the relationship between social capital, social 
networks, and economic growth . Because of this relationship, both firm and individual networks are 
increasingly important for development, as specialized labor and increasingly contingent labor 
arrangements require workers and firms to maintain connections in the region. 
Coleman and Granovetter connected social capital to human capital (Coleman, 1988; 
Granovetter, 1985). Social connections play an important role in the development of human capital 
both in direct ways, through family and other social networks specifically, and more generally 
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through association of others who have benefitted from such social capital (Coleman, 1988). But the 
relationship is not as clear-cut as some have argued. Granovetter posits that the embeddedness 
associated with high levels of social capital can have both positive and negative effects on the 
economic relations (Granovetter, 1985). And while weak ties can aid in the development of human 
capital, too many strong ties may actually hinder such development due to the inherently limited and 
homogeneous nature of the latter (Granovetter, 1973, 1983). 
Extending this connection to firms, networks can take the form of industrial clusters. But 
unlike the more neo-classical types of clustering that is based on crude agglomeration or a model of 
the industrial complex, social networks of firms and individuals characterize a form of clustering 
based more on trust than impersonal, or arm’s length, market interactions (Gordon & McCann, 
2000). This informality based in trust then creates an environment in which innovation and 
efficiency can flourish, and regional competitiveness increase (Malecki, 2002; Uzzi, 1997). Uzzi 
used this social network analysis to evaluate the competitiveness of the garment industry in New 
York (Uzzi, 1996). Using metrics such as first- and second-order network coupling, network size 
and centrality, and membership in business organizations, he found that the most competitive firms 
were those with an integrated network of embedded and arm’s length ties. However, this may not 
hold true in practice, where large firms may squelch innovation and crowd out small firms in a 
competition for resources (Christopherson & Clark, 2007a, 2007b). 
2.4 Industry Location Incentives 
State and local governments have a long history of using government policies to lure 
businesses to their jurisdictions, but the rapid proliferation of such policies since in the last thirty 
years has led to an increase in interregional competition that some have termed a “new war between 
the states” (Buss, 2001; Holmes, 1995; Ledebur & Woodward, 1990; LeRoy, 2007). However, while 
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these policies have been popular among policymakers and voters as potential job creators (Buss, 
2001; Holmes, 1995; Markusen & Nesse, 2007; Rolnick, 2007), some economists and urban 
planners have been skeptical of their efficacy and efficiency (Holmes, 1995; Markusen & Nesse, 
2007; Rolnick, 2007). Tax incentives have been a particularly popular tool for economic 
development in recent years, especially after the passage of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and other national policies that have forced states to become even more aggressive in 
competing for business (Buss, 2001). 
Economists generally have evaluated tax incentives using three criteria: fiscal and economic 
impacts, location efficiency, and tax equity. Most studies of industry tax incentives have focused on 
the first criterion. Fiscal and economic impacts are related, and though the relationship is complex, 
one would generally expect the two to move in the same direction in response to government 
incentives to specific businesses or industries. In other words, positive economic impacts would be 
expected lead to positive fiscal impacts and vice versa, since as business revenues rise, tax revenues 
would rise as well. 
This renewed interest in supply-side attraction strategies is surprising, however, given the 
evolution of economic development tools leading up to it. Ted Bradshaw and Edward Blakely wrote 
of a “third wave” of economic development policies (Bradshaw & Blakely, 1999). The first wave 
emphasized direct payments to firms to attract them to the region. The second wave focused on 
developing existing local firms and entrepreneurship, and the third wave emphasizes the importance 
of creating a “supportive economic development marketplace.” (Bradshaw & Blakely, 1999, p. 230). 
Fitzgerald and Leigh (Fitzgerald & Leigh, 2002) described a similar evolution, and the two were 
later merged by Blakely and Leigh (2009). So, what has created this seeming reversal of a decades-
long trend? The final of the combined five phases of economic development strategies described by 
Blakely and Leigh is then criticized by the authors, because the reliance of market solutions based on 
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industrial clusters, especially in key growth industries, can lead to concerns about sustainability and 
equity (Blakely & Leigh, 2009). 
2.4.1 Hysteresis and the labor market growth 
If the goal of incentives is to increase employment in the long-run, can this be achieved by 
the short-term employment gains that most incentives offer? According to Bartik, the answer is yes 
(1991, pp. 11-12). Economists borrowed the term hysteresis3 from the natural sciences to describe 
this phenomenon, and Bartik showed that it seemed to fit. According to his research, a one-time 
impact on the employment rate had effects rippling out for at least eight years following, affecting 
unemployment rates, labor force participation, and upgrades in occupational status. But while such 
incentives can have positive long-term effects, he later cautions against overestimating these gains 
and allowing business interests dominate in the debate on incentive policies (Bartik, 2007). The 
empirical evidence on the efficacy of local incentives remains mixed, however, and seems to suggest 
relatively modest gains in some specific situations (Hissong, 2003). 
2.4.2 Critiques of Incentives 
Fiscal and economic impacts are not the only criteria on which economic development 
incentive programs have been judged. As incentive programs aimed at certain firms have morphed 
into programs to develop industrial clusters, several key criticisms remain. In particular, I wish to 
highlight concerns about location efficiency, rent-seeking behavior, opportunity costs and tax 
inequality. 
                                                 
3 In the natural sciences, the term refers to magnetic and elastic properties of certain materials, and is typically used in 
economics to refer to a change in equilibrium after an economic shock such as a major recession (Martin, 2012). 
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2.4.2.1 Location inefficiency 
One of the strongest economic arguments is that short-term incentives can’t make up for 
long-run location disadvantages. Many studies have suggested that tax rates and tax incentives 
represent a low priority for firm location decisions. (Mackay, 1994; Markusen & Nesse, 2007). This 
is largely because the advantages they represent are small relative to other more important factors in 
determining the most efficient firm location. This argument suggests one of two outcomes: that if 
attraction policies are successful in bringing economic activity to inefficient locations, eventually the 
firm will move to a more efficient location, or at least harm more efficient producers not receiving 
subsidies (Thomas, 2007); or that incentives can only succeed when the location decision is between 
equally efficient locations. The former is clearly bad policy for sustained economic growth, but the 
latter may only succeed if not subjected to other issues, such as rent-seeking behavior, inefficient 
allocation of public resources, and tax inequality. 
2.4.2.2 Rent-seeking behavior and a “race to the bottom” 
A major concern of many types of incentive programs is the concern that it encourages rent-
seeking behavior, with businesses seeking policy changes that benefit individual firms or industries, 
rather than the economic gains derived from competition. This concern views rent seeking as 
assuming a zero-sum game, in which powerful interests simply redistribute existing economic 
activity rather than creating new wealth (Markusen & Nesse, 2007). 
Related to rent seeking is the issue of a “race to the bottom,” where jurisdictions merely 
compete to redistribute existing economic activity from rent-seeking firms and industries by 
outbidding others while increasingly reducing the long-term tax revenues and economic welfare of 
each jurisdiction, and ultimately the general welfare (Fisher, 2007; Fisher & Peters, 1997; Markusen 
& Nesse, 2007; Peters & Fisher, 1995). Models based on the “prisoner’s dilemma” and game theory 
suggest that this may be the case (Holmes, 1995). 
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2.4.2.3 Opportunity costs 
Some critics have pointed out that even seemingly successful incentive programs may 
replacing policies that could use those same resources to achieve a greater impact on local economic 
development (Markusen & Nesse, 2007). This common counterfactual argument suggests the 
importance of considering several possible uses of public funds, and the outcomes likely with each, 
before choosing one approach. Those who advocate for more sustainable policies might argue that 
public funds would be better spent on improving the overall business climate of the jurisdiction by 
focusing on workforce development, infrastructure, and the regulatory regime (Blakely & Bradshaw, 
2002; Blakely & Leigh, 2009). 
2.4.2.4 Tax inequality 
Tax incentives for firms also have distributional effects on tax fairness. Tax incentives shift 
the tax burden from taxpayers to corporate ownership (Thomas, 2007). In addition, they represent an 
increasing regressivity in state and local tax systems, as progressive taxes like the income tax has 
been cut while more regressive taxes such as consumption taxes and fees for government services 
have been raised (Fisher, 2007). 
2.5 Motion Picture Industry Organization 
The way creative industries are organized is different from other sectors such as 
manufacturing or retail. These industries, especially those as complex as the motion picture industry, 
require many working parts to come together for specific projects that may last anywhere from a few 
days to a few months, but rarely longer than a year. In addition, projects vary widely in their location 
depending on exterior scenery requirements. The heavy use of subcontractors and individuals makes 
existing networks especially important for this project-based, variable-location production scheme. 
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2.5.1 Networks and Project-based Production in Creative Industries 
Flexible specialization, project-based work and contingent labor arrangements are especially 
important in the film and entertainment industries (Christopherson & Storper, 1989; Storper & 
Christopherson, 1987). Another related industry in which this is true is the new media industry. A 
study of new media workers in New York showed that, given the project-based nature of the work 
and the non-traditional work arrangements of the work force, local social networks were the most 
important source for employment opportunities (Batt, Christopherson, Rightor, & Van Jaarsveld, 
2001). The importance of social networks for project-based production was further substantiated by 
Neff et al. (Neff, 2005; Neff, Wissinger, & Zukin, 2005). The significance of networks in these 
industries represents an opportunity for local economic development, since networks are more 
difficult to move than large firms and footloose production (Batt et al., 2001; Christopherson & 
Storper, 1989). Finally, it is worth noting that arts and entertainment industry workers tend to, as 
Batt et al. found with new media workers, co-locate (Currid & Williams, 2010). Florida et al. call 
this phenomenon “geographies of scope” (Florida, Mellander, & Stolarick, 2009), which they define 
as “significant, large-scale concentrations of key related skills, inputs and capabilities” (Florida, 
Mellander, & Stolarick, 2012, p. 198). They found a close spatial connection between many 
segments of the entertainment industry, though these connections seem to be diminishing over time. 
Studies in California, Texas and New York seem to confirm the importance of labor and firm 
networks for the film industry. Christopherson and Storper noted the importance of fairly closed 
networks in the Southern California film industry, especially given the familial and social contacts 
necessary to break into Hollywood (1986). When Texas began to target the film industry in the 
1990s, they found both dramatic growth and increased competition by other states (Weinstein & 
Clower, 2000). The authors concluded that only areas capable of maintaining strong human and 
physical infrastructure could be competitive in the industry. And as recently as 2010, Christopherson 
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and Rightor suggested that, among other things, New York’s comparative advantage in the industry 
was largely due to the concentration of creative talent located there (2010). 
Citing earlier studies of Los Angeles and New York, Christopherson and Rightor identified 
what they described as six “critical components” for a sustainable film industry. These include  
• The presence of the industry decision makers (studio executives, producers, etc.), 
• specialized business services such as attorneys, investment bankers, location scouts, and 
agents,  
• smaller service businesses catering to the film industry,  
• training and education programs in specialized fields,  
• studios and other production, rehearsal, and sound-recording spaces,  
• and the research and development that comes from industry-specific events and programs 
such as trade shows and film festivals (Christopherson & Rightor, 2010, pp. 345-346). 
The question is, can locations outside of Los Angeles and New York create and sustain these 
components, and thus nurture a competitive, self-sustaining industry cluster? 
2.5.2 “Runaway production” 
Technology and globalization has made industries in general more “footloose” than they 
have been previously (Bartik, 2007), but this is especially true in the motion picture industry 
(Christopherson & Storper, 1989; Lukinbeal, 2004; Scott, 2002; Weinstein & Clower, 2000). The 
concern about “runaway production” began in the 1980s and 1990s, as vertical disintegration was 
deconcentrating the power of a few firms (Storper & Christopherson, 1987), while Canada and other 
locations began seriously competing for film industry production (Lukinbeal, 2004), and this in turn 
led many states in the U.S. to bid for work which might otherwise go abroad (Christopherson & 
Rightor, 2010). 
Storper and Christopherson found that even as the actual filming moved to other locations, 
employment and firms in the motion picture industry reconcentrated the Los Angeles area (Storper 
& Christopherson, 1987), a pattern that has not changed dramatically since (Christopherson & 
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Rightor, 2010). Some have argued, however, that the “hegemony of Hollywood” may be threatened 
in global markets, especially as other countries increase their support for indigenous cultural 
production (Scott, 2002). 
The debate about “runway production” has evolved over time, becoming less about major 
studios controlling production and forcing “independents” to work in established locations, and more 
about the freedom of producers to shoot wherever they found it most cost-advantageous 
(Christopherson & Clark, 2007c). The results, as Scott and others have found earlier, has been a 
continued concentration of the high-wage, high-skilled employment in Los Angeles, while shooting 
locations increasingly move out based on cost and aesthetic considerations (Christopherson & Clark, 
2007c). 
2.5.3 Need for specialized infrastructure 
As the studies by Storper, Christopherson, Scott and Lukinbeal have suggested, the complex 
of specialized resources in the Los Angeles region, and to a somewhat lesser extent, in New York 
City, are a key component in building and reinforcing them as industry centers. But the sheer scale 
and sexiness of the industry has made it seem possible for other states to get a piece of this lucrative 
pie. The question is, can these remote film production centers ever become more than just an 
expansion of the old studio back lot? Obviously, some policymakers believe they can. 
The bid for a local film industry is a challenging strategy. Lacking the labor organization so 
important to Hollywood, which relies on social networks, trade unions and established training 
institutions such as University of Southern California and UCLA (Storper & Christopherson, 1987), 
replicating this milieu will be a long and tedious process (Weinstein & Clower, 2000). Or as 
Christopherson and Rightor pointed out, “Without this infrastructure, a state that subsidizes 
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footloose film or TV production projects has little chance of building a sustainable local industry.” 
(2010, p. 346) 
Hong (2010) developed a series of indices to represent man-made and natural amenities 
deemed attractive to film industry production. Hong found that man-made infrastructure such as 
those cited by Christopherson and Rightor (2010) and Weinstein and Clower (2000) had the greatest 
positive effects on film production, along with the state’s tax incentive policies (Hong, 2010). 
Murphy et al. expanded on this, interviewing managers in media and computer game 
companies on the factors affecting their location decisions (2015). They found that so-called “hard” 
factors such as labor availability, communications infrastructure and agglomeration effects are still 
primary, “soft” factors—work environment, urban amenities and social/cultural environment—were 
more important when the “hard” factors were satisfactory across a variety of locations. These “soft” 
amenities did, however, vary in their importance relative to company size and whether they were 
foreign or domestic, with “hard” factors being more important in smaller indigenous firms. 
2.6 Impacts of the Film Industry and MPIs 
Many studies have attempted to value the effectiveness of movie production incentives, and 
the results have been notably varied. This may be in part because the vast majority has been 
conducted by or at the behest of industry representatives and/or advocates. Following is a brief 
summary of several studies, which fall roughly into three categories: general studies, looking at the 
nation as a whole or several states; state studies, usually done in advance of or following the 
implementation of MPIs, and academic studies in peer-reviewed journals with no sponsorship by 
interested parties. My research suggests that this last category represents only a handful among the 
dozens undertaken. 
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2.6.1 Previous studies: fiscal & economic impact analyses 
2.6.1.1 General summaries 
Reports on multiple states tend to represent entrenched interests. Of the four such reports I 
discovered since 2009, one represented industry interests—the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA)—while two others represented anti-tax or anti-business research organizations—
the Tax Foundation and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) respectively. The fourth, 
a report by the National Governors Association, relied heavily on the MPAA report (Motion Picture 
Association of America, 2009) by as the basis for the economic impact of the motion picture and 
television industry. Not surprisingly it reported that  
studies have shown that the motion picture industry benefits state and local economies by 
attracting out-of-state investments; creating high-paying jobs; contributing to the economic 
and civic vitality of communities; and stimulating cultural tourism. (Pierce, 2008) 
The report also cited ten state-level reports, most of which were funded by film offices or 
related entities, and seems to encourage states to compete for mobile film production. 
The Tax Foundation and the CBPP, groups more skeptical of using tax money for industry-
specific subsidies, provided two other studies in 2010. In the Tax Foundation report did not conceal 
its message, entitling it “Movie Production Incentives: Blockbuster Support for Lackluster Policy” 
(Luther, 2010). In it they give detailed breakdowns on the types of MPIs used, their growth over 
time, and estimates on their costs to states and their taxpayers. The report is especially critical of the 
transferable and/or refundable tax credits offered by (at the time) some 29 states and Puerto Rico, as 
well as a more recent innovation, direct cash rebates. It also suggests that jobs created are often 
either simply shifted from other employment, filled by out-of-state residents, or short-term, and that 
the revenue gains shown were either illusory or non-existent. It cites political “rent-seeking” and an 
“arms race” mentality with encouraging MPI growth, and ultimately recommends federal, 
multilateral, or if necessary, unilateral, moratoria on MPI competition. Similarly, the CBPP report is 
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subtitled “Not Much Bang for Too Many Bucks,” and cites many of the same problems as the Tax 
Foundation report (Tannenwald, 2010). This report also includes a detailed critique of one key state 
study, the Ernst & Young study commissioned by New Mexico to replace the earlier, less sanguine 
report by New Mexico State University’s Arrowhead Center, which they say exaggerated the 
tourism impact, counted much of the payroll spending twice, and lacked methodological 
transparency. 
Lack of transparency and corruption are yet more reasons to be concerned with MPIs. 
Governing magazine reported that not only was it virtually impossible to get reliable data from 
anyone other than industry or film office sources, but that in at least two states, Iowa and Louisiana, 
film office officials and film producers have been convicted on charges of inflating film 
expenditures ("Former Iowa Film Office head gets deferred judgment, probation," 2011; "Judge 
sentences film producer to prison for Iowa film tax credit scandal," 2011; Patton, 2010). 
2.6.1.2 Louisiana 
After nearly four years of offering 25% tax credits for filmmakers, a 2006 Louisiana Film 
Office-commissioned report by Economics Research Associates (ERA) showed weak growth. At 
that point, although production activity did increase, there were no indications that a “homegrown, 
local film market” had been established (Christopherson & Rightor, 2010). Updates in 2009, also by 
ERA, and in 2011 by BaxStarr Consulting Group, showed progress toward that end. In 2009, ERA 
indicated that “a majority of production activity occurring in the state of Louisiana is indigenous,” 
meaning by local production companies and service providers (Economics Research Associates, 
2009). The 2011 reported a large shift in the proportion of production budgets spent in the state, 
from 34% in 2006 to 64% in 2010, presumed to be a result of the change in the tax credit law which 
applied the credits only to in-state spending. The report went on to say that 
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This shift in spending is significant because it reflects the growing maturity of the film 
industry in Louisiana. For example, services that once had to be performed in Los Angeles 
can now be secured in Shreveport, and jobs that were once found only in Burbank, CA are 
now based in New Orleans. (Baxter, 2011) 
A 2015 study indicated that while the tax incentive did have a positive impact on the state’s 
economy in 2014, as measured by business sales, household earnings and jobs, it cost the state over 
$171 in lost revenue and about $14,000/job created (Loren C. Scott & Associates, 2015). 
2.6.1.3 New Mexico 
As was noted earlier, controversy erupted with competing reports in New Mexico. First, the 
Arrowhead Center of NMSU was asked to study the impact of the film industry on the state’s 
economy (Popp & Peach, 2008), but the results painted a very negative picture, showing only 14 
cents in return for every dollar spent in state incentives. Enter Ernst & Young, brought in to “revise” 
the Arrowhead Center report by the state film office unhappy with the earlier report (Francis, 2009). 
This report showed a much more respectable 93 cents on the dollar in state taxes, and $1.50 in all 
taxes in the state. But the controversy continued with mutual challenges to the methodology of each 
(Kamerick, 2009), including a memo from the chief economist of the Legislative Finance Committee 
which challenged the Ernst & Young study point-by-point, ultimately showing a return of 25 cents 
on the dollar, much closer to the Arrowhead Center study (Francis, 2009). 
More recently, a four-phase study commissioned by the New Mexico Film Office by MNP 
showed that the industry supported between 600-900 jobs annually from 2010-14, at the cost of 
$8,519/FTE job, but only returned $0.43 in state and local taxes for each dollar spent on the 
production incentives granted (Meyers Norris Penny LLP., 2014, 2015). 
2.6.1.4 Florida 
A study commissioned by The Governor’s Office of Film & Entertainment showed a 
surprising, if somewhat obscured, moment of honesty in the section on “Growing the Indigenous 
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Industry”: “… anecdotal evidence points to Florida as a being seen as a poor place for industry 
business.” [italics added] (Harper, 2009, p. 21) Maybe less surprising were the suggestions for 
improvements, which included “better, more consistent incentives; increased infrastructure; an 
improved business climate and better marketing of what the state has to offer.” [italics added] 
(Harper, 2009, p. 21) The SWOT analysis included strengths like industry infrastructure and existing 
production centers, and threats by competing states and countries. 
A more recent study in 2015 looked at the return on investment for tax incentives, and in all 
three scenarios used, the ROI was positive but less than one (0.25-0.54); i.e., for every dollar spent, 
between $0.25 and $0.54 was returned to the state’s revenues (Florida Office of Economic & 
Demographic Research, 2015). 
2.6.1.5 North Carolina 
For some thirty years, the biggest film center outside of Los Angeles and New York had been 
in southeastern North Carolina. After seeing its preeminence challenged by Louisiana and other 
states offering MPIs, the regional film commission ordered a study from the UNCW Center for 
Business and Economic Services (Hall, Dumas, & Schuhmann, 2009). This fairly straightforward 
economic impact analysis was based on the typical cost structure of four “mid-major” film 
productions per year, defined as productions with budgets of approximately $25 million, and showed 
an estimated annual impact of $75 million in the three-county MSA, with an associated estimated 
$2.1 million in property taxes (p. 15). 
A more recent report from Ernst & Young (2009)(Ernst & Young, 2009) showed a return-on-
investment of $0.98-$1.30 for each dollar spent at the 15 percent tax credit level, with the higher 
number representing the addition of local tax revenues. But despite the estimate that raising the tax 
credit to 25 percent would lower that ROI to $0.69-0.92 in 2010 and to $0.67-0.89 in 2011, the 
report issued this ominous statement: 
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North Carolina’s 15% film credit attracted a significant number of productions in 2007, but 
has grown increasingly less effective as other states have adopted more competitive film 
credit rates ranging from 25% to 42%. (p. 13) 
Not surprisingly, the state legislature promptly increased the tax credit to a capped 25 percent 
in July 2010 (FilmNC, 2012), before eliminating it two years later. In the interim, two conflicting 
reports were issued, similar to the earlier case in New Mexico, in which a film office funded report 
showed very positive impacts ($1.52 of state and local tax revenue and $9.10 of direct spending for 
every $1.00 of tax credits issued) (Handfield, 2014), while the state’s Fiscal Research Division 
found errors in that report resulting in a negative impact of $33.1 million and an ROI of $0.61 
(McHugh & Boardman, 2014). 
2.6.2 Academic studies 
One of the earliest academic works on the impact of the film industry and policies to promote 
it predated the tax credit boom of the 2000s, using Texas as a case study. In their conclusion, 
Weinstein and Clower (2000) answered the question “What can or should states do to attract the film 
and video industry?” by offering three pieces of advice: have a professional, well-funded film 
commission, fund the training of human resources and a “fiscal environment that is attractive to 
filmmakers,” and focus on assisting indigenous producers (Weinstein & Clower, 2000, p. 393). They 
quoted Christopherson and Storper to support their view that, regarding the ability for states to 
attract film production, “only those states that have in place the requisite human and physical 
infrastructure will succeed. (Weinstein & Clower, 2000, p. 392).” 
A more recent study of the New York film industry is one of the more comprehensive studies 
not funded by industry advocates or opponents, and like the Texas study, distinguishes between 
locations with existing human capital and location amenities and those lacking the same 
(Christopherson & Rightor, 2010). Drawing on previous state studies, they warn of weak and 
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variable results for states other than California and New York, and cite issues about transparency, 
negative impacts on state revenues, concerns about tax equity, picking industry winners and losers, 
and the “race-to-the-bottom mentality” that state competition creates. Because of these reasons, they 
warn against subsidies even when states like New York have a distinct competitive advantage 
already. 
In addition to the peer-reviewed articles, one dissertation addressed the question of MPIs and 
their impact on film production activities as well. Hong (2010) used a detailed set of statewide 
amenities to measure the impact of these as well as tax incentives on film production locations, first 
for all states, and then in a quasi-experimental study of Louisiana and New Mexico. He found that 
nationally, tax incentives had the greatest effect on film production activity, though in the study of 
matched states, the overall economic impact of such policies was negligible. 
2.7 Toward a Theory of Sustainable Development for Creative Industries 
Given the intense interest in creative industries and their potential contribution to local 
economic development, the lack of theoretical and empirical analysis on the mechanisms by which 
industry incentives can be used to develop such industries is surprising. The primary contribution of 
these essays is to move toward bridging that gap. By combining elements of the previously discussed 
theories, I have constructed what I believe might be an effective theoretical model for the 
development of sustainable creative industries. By combining more traditional growth mechanisms 
with an emphasis on developing social networks, I believe that polices can be fashioned to build a 
sustainable industry. I do not mean to suggest, however, that such a theory can be applied regardless 
of traditional components of comparative advantage. 
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2.7.1 The importance of “stickiness” for a footloose industry 
The mobility of talent and production makes location development a challenge for 
policymakers. One the one hand, offering monetary incentives should lead to increased production 
activity, and therefore fiscal and economic benefits, but these benefits would be at risk should the 
subsidies be reduced, or if other locations offered more lucrative incentives. 
 
2.7.2 The Creative Industries Development Model 
This mobility problem may be addressed by focusing efforts on not simply attraction 
strategies, but strategies that strengthen the networks of firms and individuals within the state’s 
jurisdiction. As local networks become stronger and more integrated, cumulative causation and 
entrepreneurship models suggest a self-reinforcing virtuous circle. The causation model postulates 
that tax incentives will increase both local and mobile production activities within the state. Over 
time this will lead to increases in the number of firms and individuals working in the film industry 
locating within the state. Repeated interactions between local participants and mobile participants 
will reinforce the local growth, and make it easier for mobile productions to return to the state while 
creating increasing incentives to initiate local productions as well. Agglomeration and cumulative 
causation will continue to reinforce this activity, and as the networks are strengthened and the 
specialized infrastructure and services are developed, the state can then reduce or eliminate the tax 
incentives because the network will have created a competitive advantage that would be difficult to 
overcome with mere subsidies from other states. This model is diagramed in Figure 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 The Creative Industries Development Model 
 
 
This model is not universally applicable. It does require the state to have other competitive 
advantages as well, such as natural amenities for filming locations and a critical mass of financial 
assets and population to support industry development. The assumption here is that, given some 
competitive advantages in a specific creative industry could then allow policies to establish that 
industry in a sustainable way. This means that, while not all states may be able to use this model for 
the film industry, some states may, while others might compete for music, digital entertainment, or 
new media industries. Therefore, applying this model without regard for the existing advantages for 
a given industry is still likely to falter as a long-term strategy. 
  
  27 
CHAPTER 3 THE BIG PICTURE: STATE MOTION PICTURE 
INCENTIVES IN THE U.S., 2002-2013 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
After witnessing the success of Canadian strategies to attract U.S. film production in the 
1990s, states and localities began offering financial incentives in an effort to lure film and video 
production away from their traditional hubs in California and New York (Christopherson & Rightor, 
2010). This effort increased dramatically in the 2000s, both in scope and in scale. Production activity 
can now locate in states offering rebates of up to 40 percent of costs, even if this exceeds their actual 
tax bills, and all but a handful of states offer some form of tax incentives (Christopherson & Rightor, 
2010; Katz & Rosenthal, 2006; National Conference of State Legislatures, 2011; Vock, 2008). While 
some states may be reducing incentive packages in the current climate of fiscal austerity, others are 
doubling down on that strategy as an effort to stimulate job growth and increased economic activity. 
And while most states tout many successes from these programs in both metrics, the question of 
whether or not such policies promote long-term sustainable economic development has not been 
fully answered. 
In this, the first of two related studies, I will use data from the County Business Patterns 
(CBP), the American Community Survey4 (ACS), and data on movie production incentives (MPIs) 
collected by the author over the years 2002-2013 to view changes in state-level economic activity by 
the level of incentives offered. Using cross-sectional and panel data for industry, employment and 
                                                 
4 For the ACS data, I used the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
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occupational employment as dependent variables, I will use a variety of descriptive data and 
regression models to view the relationship between the level of incentives and the outcomes for the 
film industry. 
3.2 Background 
3.2.1 A Brief History of State Incentives for Film Production 
According to the Association of Film Commissioners International (AFCI), the first film 
commission was established in the late-1940s. By the mid-1970s, there were enough film offices to 
form the AFCI, which quickly grew to be both a medium of information exchange and the host of an 
annual expo for location scouting. Now virtually every state, hundreds of U.S. cities and regions, and 
over 30 countries, have created such commissions for the purpose of attracting and facilitating film 
and television production (AFCI, 2009a). What began as a liaison to help filmmakers with the legal 
and administrative aspects of the filmmaking process has now morphed into a one-stop resource for 
everything from scouting locations to, more recently, cash and in-kind incentives to promote the 
industry. It is these latter activities that will be discussed below. 
3.2.2 The Current State of Film Incentives 
As film commissions proliferated, so did the competition for a piece of the growing pie of 
film and television production dollars. Commissions added more and more services, but two new 
trends began to be seen which led to a sea change in their methods. First, a decline in manufacturing 
in general led state policymakers to seek high-income service industries to replace industries lost to 
low wage countries. The second came when Canada (and several other countries), starting in the 
mid-1970s and expanding dramatically in the 1980s, began offering direct economic incentives for 
Canadian film production (CanagaRetna, 2007; Finn, Hoskins, & McFadyen, 1996). Suddenly the 
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fear of “runaway production” was extended to high-end services, leading state film commissions to 
up the ante, beginning to offer their own cash incentives in the form of first tax credits, then direct 
rebates and even grants.  Below each will be discussed in more detail. 
3.2.2.1 Tax credits and rebates 
Direct cash rebates for film and video production are the latest types of incentives to be 
introduced. While many states offer tax credits, some of which are transferable (see below), direct 
rebates are generally simpler and, understandably, preferred by producers (Vock, 2008). The 
difference between credits and rebates is that credits are based on taxes paid, and rebates on gross 
spending. Few states offer rebates, but others could join them if this proves to be an effective 
strategy in an increasingly competitive marketplace. 
Tax credits are a more common approach, as they are used by a majority of states offering 
financial incentives, but they can be problematic for producers. Preferred over straight credits are 
transferable credits, which allow producers to trade their credits to local companies or individuals 
who would like to reduce their state tax liability. On the other hand, most film producers don’t want 
to be in the business of trading tax credits (Vock, 2008). 
Both rebates and credits come with lots of conditions. Typically, these may be based on the 
overall budget, but they also have minimum budget requirements. Sometimes they may also have 
minimum days of filming, and “sweeteners” attached to hiring local residents or participating in 
training programs (AFCI, 2009b; CanagaRetna, 2007; Pierce, 2008). Despite the rapid proliferation 
of these incentives, the number of states offering tax credits or rebates has declined since their peak 
in 2010 as a result of incidences of corruption, ineffectiveness, and perhaps most importantly, the 
fiscal constraints following the economic downturn of 2008. 
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3.2.2.2 Sales and Use Tax Exemptions 
Similar to tax credits are sales and use tax exemptions. These are usually specific to certain 
categories of items typically associated with film production, such as film stock, videotape, 
equipment rentals and purchases, etc. (Harper, 2009). At least 25 states currently offer some type of 
sales and/or use tax exemption for film and television production. 
3.2.2.3 Bed Tax Exemptions 
The “bed tax” exemption, or hotel occupancy tax exemption, is another popular incentive. At 
least a dozen states offer this incentive, designed to somewhat offset the cost of moving cast and 
crew from their home base, but most states only begin the exemption after a minimum stay of 30 
days or so. One exception is California, although counties and municipalities there tend to use the 
30-day rule as well (Harper, 2009). 
3.2.2.4 Bonuses 
Many states offer bonuses for specific locations or times. Florida offers an “off-season” 
bonus, and many states offer bonuses for filming in rural or economically disadvantaged areas of the 
state. Another common bonus is offered for hiring local residents, though this is usually a bonus to 
the tax credits discussed earlier. Other bonuses are given for longer stays or ongoing projects (such 
as television series), and for participating in workforce development projects (AFCI, 2009b; 
CanagaRetna, 2007; Harper, 2009). 
3.2.2.5 Infrastructure projects 
Infrastructure development projects have been increasingly popular in recent years. As with 
many such innovations, Louisiana may have led the way with this type of incentive when the state 
began an aggressive effort to build studio space for film and video production. They have been so 
successful in spurring new studio development that although they could currently support fifteen 
  31 
studios with current work, nine more than currently exist, plans are on the books to build another 32 
studios by next year (Vock, 2008). Other states taking this approach are North Carolina, who’s 
“Dream Stage” is scheduled for this spring (Wobbekind, Horvath, Lewandowski, DiPersio, & 
Willoughby, 2008, and New Mexico and Massachusetts are also putting state investments into studio 
infrastructure {Harper, 2009 #342). 
3.2.2.6 Loans and Grants 
New Mexico, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York all have some type of conditional loan 
program for film production. These loans are at below-market rate, often 0% interest, and sometimes 
(in the case of New Mexico at least) contingent on profit-sharing in lieu of interest (Harper, 2009; 
Pierce, 2008). Washington, D.C., has a unique grant program, conditioned only on a minimum of 
spending and a five day stay, while other states such as Texas, South Carolina, and Louisiana offer 
grants for rural locations and workforce development programs (CanagaRetna, 2007; Harper, 2009; 
Pierce, 2008). 
3.2.2.7 Other free services 
Fee-waivers for a variety of permits and other governmental services are also widespread. 
The most common practice is “fee-free” filming, where the state waives permits and location fees for 
state-owned property, and even in some cases, will negotiate fees for non-state-owned locations as 
well. Maine offers free rental of surplus property as well. 
3.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The primary research question of this study is that of the scale and scope of movie production 
incentives during the last decade. In addition to this descriptive question, I will consider the 
relationship between MPIs and the growth of local motion picture industry firms and employment. 
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Based on the theory behind industrial economic incentives generally, I would expect that the 
number of firms and employees in each state would be positively correlated with the tax credit 
offered. However, I also hypothesize that since the states are competing for this business, that the 
relative effort over time would also contribute to the employment and firm frequency outcomes. 
The key independent variable will be the MPI itself, expressed as a lagged dummy variable. I 
also looked at the level of the MPIs as a factor, but they tend to be in a narrow range of values, and 
have not changed much over time. Other independent variables will include total employment and 
establishments for the state in all industries and several other factors for production location choice. 
Dependent variables will be the number of employees and establishments in the film industry 
from the County Business Patterns and, and the number of individuals employed in film-related 
occupations from the American Community Survey. 
It is important to note that this study will not consider employment and firms working in 
projects in states other than their home states. But while this may be an important consideration for 
the overall economic impacts of film industry incentives, my purpose here is only to view the impact 
on sustainable economic development of the industry cluster, which I am defining as the growth of 
in-state workers and firms. 
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
• H1: The number of film industry firms, employees and occupations in each state is positively 
correlated with the existence of tax credits. 
• H2: The persistence of these subsidies over the years contributes to the employment, firm and 
occupational outcomes. 
• H3: MPIs and their persistence contributes to the growth of film industry employment, firms 
and occupations. 
• H4: MPIs and their persistence increase the relative concentration of film industry 
employment (location quotient) in the state. 
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3.4 Data and Methodology 
The key data used was a combination of state-by-state movie production incentive (MPI) 
levels for the years 2002-2013, and employment, establishment and occupation data for the same 
years. The annual MPI level will serve as the independent variable (IV), with the others serving as 
the key dependent variables (DVs). Other data will be used as controls, as indicated below. 
3.4.1 Movie Production Incentives (MPIs) 
The collection of MPI data was a bit of a challenge. While several sources offer up-to-date 
web-based information, either individually at state film commission web sites or aggregators of 
current information (Motion Picture Association of America, 2012; National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2011) or that collected at an often-unspecified point in time (Harper, 2009; Luther, 
2010), getting good data over several years was surprisingly difficult. In addition to the above 
sources, I spent a good deal of time finding and reading enabling legislation, much of which lacks 
good information on changes over time, and news articles about the passage of and/or amending of 
MPI legislation. Ultimately, I was able to compile a complete set of data from 2002 to 2013, though 
it is possible that data from a few states and/or years could have fallen through the cracks of my 
rather porous dragnet. I am engaged in an ongoing process of updating this data, as well as managing 
it in years subsequent to those represented in this study. 
The next challenge was determining what rate to use, since many states offer a variety of 
incentives based on specific criteria. For this study, I chose to use only one rate: that of the state 
income tax credit or rebate for general expenditures. This means I did not include add-ons for local 
hiring, expenditures in economically troubled areas of a state, variations of rates based on total 
expenditure or production type, or a handful of others. I did, however add credits that were both 
applied to general expenditures and relatively easy to get. One notable example is the extra ten-
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percent credit offered by Georgia for adding a “Filmed in Georgia” logo to the credits of a 
production. 
Ten states and the District of Columbia had no fixed, funded tax incentive for film 
production, and since these states also had low film industry concentration, making them less than 
ideal control observations, they were dropped from the data set. Table 3.1 shows the 22 states in the 
final sample with their MPIs by year. 
Since MPIs are not immediately effective in attracting film production, I calculated both a 
lagged variable, such that the MPI for the previous year would be associated with the employment 
and establishment level of the current year. And given the relative stability of MPI levels over the 
period, I also created contemporaneous and lagged dummy variables, where 0 indicates no MPI, and 
1 indicates an MPI in effect. And finally, to assess the cumulative effects of MPIs over time, I 
included a variable for the number of years the MPI was in effect. This variable was calculated by 
beginning with the previous year, and adding one for every year prior to that year; e.g., for 2010, a 
state with MPIs in effect from 2007-2010 would have a score of three, one for each year from 2007-
2009. The panel for the following year, 2011, would have a score of four, one for each year from 
2007-2010. 
3.4.2 Employment and Establishment Data 
For the employment and establishment data, I used the County Business Patterns (CBP), an 
annual series of national and subnational economic data by industry. The number of establishments 
and employment is reported from the week of March 12. While this single point in time might be a 
problem for some inquiries, in this case it might be advantageous, because while film production 
takes place throughout the year, the winter months are more likely to reflect more permanent 
patterns of employment, rather than seasonal booms in the more temperate times of the year. This 
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also makes it somewhat more likely that film industry workers will be employed in their state of 
residence, since the CBP only counts workers based on the location of the establishment for which 
they are working. In other words, while the establishments are located in the states with which they 
are associated in the data, the employees may or may not reside in that state. I did consider using the 
American Community Survey (ACS) or Current Population Survey (CPS), which do count workers 
in their state of residence, but the industry codes are neither comparable nor granular enough to 
separate employment in video production and distribution from that in exhibition. 
To measure data specifically for the motion picture industry, I chose to use four six-digit 
NAICS codes under the heading of 5121, “Motion Picture and Video Industries” (see Table 3.2). 
Since around half of this higher-level category is employed in the exhibition portion of the industry 
(i.e., movie theaters), I subtracted this category from the total for 5121. The reason for choosing this 
method of calculation was that much of the data for the appropriate subcategories was suppressed, 
therefore making it difficult to get enough direct observations for meaningful analysis of each 
subcategory separately. 
The County Business Patterns data includes full- and part-time employees working at this 
establishment whose payroll was reported to the Internal Revenue Service. It does not include: 
• Temporary staffing obtained from a staffing service. 
• Contractors, subcontractors, or independent contractors. 
• Full- or part-time leased employees whose payroll was filed under an employee leasing 
company's EIN. 
• Purchased or managed services, such as janitorial, guard, or landscape services. 
• Professional or technical services purchased from another firm, such as software consulting, 
computer programming, engineering, or accounting services.5 
                                                 
5 From the Economic Census questionnaire retrieved from https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-
census/2012/questionnaires/forms/in51204.pdf on May 22, 2017. 
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One concern with this data is that many values, especially in areas of smaller employment 
numbers, are suppressed for reasons of confidentiality. This was even true, as it turned out, for 
relatively highly aggregated cells at the state and 4-digit NAICS levels. Therefore, in addition to the 
11 observations dropped due to lack of MPIs, another 12 were dropped due to lack of employment 
data. Observations were dropped if either more than 3 years total or two or more consecutive years 
were unavailable. After this, there remained five states with one or two missing employment data: 
Iowa, Massachusetts, Oregon, Utah and Washington. These missing values were imputed using the 
midpoint of the employment flags given in the CBP data. Table 3.3 shows the location quotients and 
differential shifts for the 22 states in the remaining sample from 2002 to 2013, while Tables 3.4 and 
3.5 show employment and establishment growth for the same period respectively. 
3.4.3 Occupation Data 
For the occupation data, I used the 1% Sample of the IPUMS microdata based on the 
American Community Survey (ACS), an annual survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
While the ACS microdata does include industry codes for employment, these codes are only at the 
NAICS 4-digit level, making them less useful than the more detailed 6-digit codes from the County 
Business Patterns data. The occupations chosen are based on those used in a few studies by 
Christopherson et al. (Christopherson, 2008a, 2008b; Christopherson et al., 2006) as “key 
occupations” in the motion picture industry. The four key occupations chosen are Actors (2700), 
Producers & Directors (2710), Broadcast and Sound Engineering Technicians and Radio Operators 
(2900), and Television, Video, and Motion Picture Camera Operators and Editors (2920) (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2002-2013). 
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3.4.4 Control Variables 
3.4.4.1 Macro Control Variables 
1. Growth in total annual state employment 
2. Location quotient for state motion picture industry employment 
3.4.4.2 Random-Effects Control Variables 
3.4.4.2.1 Climate 
3. Average Temperature: State Average Annual Temperature, 60 months ending 12/2012 
4. Maximum Temperature: State Maximum Annual Temperature, 60 months ending 12/2012 
5. Minimum Temperature: State Minimum Annual Temperature, 60 months ending 12/2012 
6. Rainfall: State Total Annual Rainfall, 60 months ending 12/2012 
3.4.4.2.2 Accessibility 
7. Number of non-stop cities serviced 
8. Number of Flights to Los Angeles airports 
9. Distance from LA (Distance group, 1-6, 500 miles per segment) 
3.4.4.2.3 Geography 
10. Highest Point 
11. Elevation Span: Difference of highest and lowest points 
12. Coastal: Borders on an ocean 
13. MSAs >1 mil.: Number of MSAs over 1 mil. (2010), all or partial  
3.4.5 Descriptive Statistics 
After culling the states with no tax credits and suppressed employment values, I was left with 
22 states for my analysis. Since my goal is to look at long-term growth in the motion picture 
industry, I chose to report primarily on the net changes between the base year (2002) and the final 
year for which I have data (2013). For a few cases, I do show annual changes as well. Note that I am 
only looking at employment, establishments and occupations in the state; I am not evaluating overall 
economic impact, nor do I use an input-output or benefit cost analysis approach to this subject. 
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3.4.5.1 Key Variables 
As stated earlier, the key independent variable will be the MPI level for each state. This well 
be represented by the highest rate in place in that year. Dependent variables will be the employment 
and establishment level of motion picture establishments, and the number of occupations in film-
industry associated occupations.  
3.4.6 Regression analysis 
Again, since I am looking at long-term employment growth, for this study I chose to use a 
combination of Standard linear, Arellano-Bond linear dynamic, fixed-effects and random effects 
panel-data estimations. The dependent variables used are the employment growth rate for the motion 
picture industry between 2002 and 2013, using NAICS 5121 “Motion Picture and Video Industries” 
without 512130 Motion Picture & Video Exhibition category. 
I began by attempting a simple set of models, with the natural log of employment in the 
state’s motion picture industry as the dependent variable, and the MPI level and annual change for 
all twelve years as the key independent variables, with the state’s overall employment growth and 
motion picture industry location quotient as a control variables6, using robust standard errors to 
account for heteroscedasticity. Model 1 used contemporaneous MPI variables and year dummies, 
Model 2 adds the MPI Change and Year variables, and Models 3 and 4 are Arellano-Bond linear 
dynamic models, which mirror 1 and 2 respectively, but add a lagged employment variable as well. 
The coefficients are all exponentiated. Each set of four models was run using motion picture 
employment (Table 3.6), establishments (Table 3.7) and occupations (Table 3.8). The models can be 
specified with the following form: 
                                                 
6 I also used the employment growth in the US film industry, but this was automatically dropped due to collinearity. 
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MPxit = β0 + β1MPIit + β2(MPIit - MPIi(t-1)) + β3SEGit + β4LQit + β5Yit + ε 
where MPxit is the motion picture industry employment, establishments or occupations for 
each state, β1MPIit is the MPI level for each year, β2(MPIit - MPIi(t-1)) is the change in MPI from the 
previous year, β3SEGit is the overall employment growth for the state, β4LQit is the motion picture 
industry location quotient for the state, and β5Yit is the year of the observation. 
The second set of models use fixed effects estimations on the same panel data, but uses a 
fixed-effects model to address unobserved time-invariant variables and their effects. In this case, the 
models can be specified as follows: 
MPxit = β0 + β1MPIit + β2SEGit + β3LQit + β4Yit + αi + ε 
where αi is the unobservable time-invariant factors for each state. There are no lagged 
dependent variables in these models. 
And finally, the third set of models used random effects estimations on the panel data as a 
check on the fixed effects model. The random-effects models attempt to estimate known time-
invariant variables and their effects. In this case, the models can be specified as follows: 
MPxit = β0 + β1MPIit + β2(MPIit - MPIi(t-1)) + β3SEGit + β4LQit + β5Yit + β6EFit + ε 
where β6EFit is a set of unobservable time-invariant environmental factors for each state, 
including climate factors, accessibility, geography, and urban centers. Again, there are no lagged 
dependent variables in these models. 
3.5 Findings 
3.5.1 Movie production incentives 
Beginning with the MPI and motion picture production statistics, Table 3.1 shows the states 
with MPIs and the typical rate of the tax credit from 2002-2013. It is clear from this table that, 
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among the 22 states for which I have data, there was a dramatic increase in the number of states 
offering such incentives over that period, and several states increased these rates during that period 
as well. Louisiana was the early adopter here, and has been consistently in the top tier of incentive 
offers, having increased them from 15% to 25% in 2005, and again raising them to 30% in 2009, 
matching southeastern neighbor Georgia, which increased its top rate to 30% in 2008. Louisiana did 
cap their program after 2013. 
 
 
Table 3.1 State Motion Picture Incentives, 2002-2013 
State 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AZ 
  
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 0 0 0 
CA 
       
20 20 20 20 20 
CO 
    
10 10 10 10 10 10 20 20 
FL 
  
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
GA 
   
9 9 9 30 30 30 30 30 30 
IL 
       
30 30 30 30 30 
IA 
     
25 25 25 25 0 0 0 
LA 15 15 15 25 25 25 25 30 30 30 30 30 
MD 
     
25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
MA 
    
25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
MI 
      
42 42 42 32 32 32 
MN 
    
25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
NJ 
    
20 20 20 20 20 a a a 
NY 
  
10 10 10 10 30 30 30 30 30 30 
NC 
    
8.1 15 15 15 15 25 25 25 
OK 
   
15 15 15 15 35 35 35 35 35 
OR 
   
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
PA 
  
20 20 20 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
TN 
    
32 32 32 32 32 25 25 25 
TX 
       
17.5 17.5 25 25 25 
UT 
   
15 15 15 15 15 20 25 25 25 
WA 
    
30 30 30 30 30 30 0 0 
 
 
Another trend of note is the use of incentives for states traditionally strong in the film 
industry. California, still dominant in both employment and establishments, started offering 
incentives in 2009, and New York significantly increased their incentive from 10% to 30% in 2008. 
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And finally, some states did begin to reduce, suspend or discontinue their incentive programs toward 
the end of the period observed and beyond. 
Table 3.2 Selected NAICS for MP Industry 
NAICS Industry 
512110 Motion Picture & Video Production 
512120 Motion Picture & Video Distribution 
512191 Teleproduction & Other Postproduction Services 
512199 Other Motion Picture & Video Industries 
 
3.5.2 Employment, establishment and occupation growth 
3.5.2.1 Descriptive data 
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Figure 3.1 Film Industry Employment Growth by Average MPI, 2002-13 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the rather tenuous relationship between MPIs and film employment growth. 
By viewing the relationship between the average MPI and the motion picture employment growth 
during the period, I would expect to see a positive trend line develop, and though the fitted trend line 
shows a very slight upward slope, the distribution of the data show that this would be a very loose fit 
at best. 
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Furthermore, the location quotients (LQs) and shift shares do not support a positive 
relationship with MPI levels (and Table 3.3). In addition, 2013 location quotients only show three 
states with the percentage of industry employment greater than that of the U.S. as a whole, two of 
them being California (5.91) and New York (1.54), with the third being Utah (1.97). The differential 
shifts for the period 2002-13 were positive for only seven states, one of which was California (32%). 
The balance consisted of Utah (227%), North Carolina (43.7%), Louisiana (22.4%), Oregon (8.9%), 
Washington (8.6%) and Pennsylvania (8.3%). 
 
 
Table 3.4 Employment Growth by State, 2002-2013 
  Motion Picture Employment Growth  All Employment Growth  Growth 
Difference ST 2002 2013 Net Growth 2002 2013 Net Growth 
UT 917 3,573 2,657 289.9% 900,428 1,101,557 201,129 22.3% 267.5% 
NC 538 1,111 573 106.5% 3,322,004 3,421,195 99,191 3.0% 103.5% 
CA 66,785 130,132 63,347 94.9% 12,856,426 13,401,863 545,437 4.2% 90.6% 
LA 297 550 253 85.2% 1,583,308 1,687,956 104,648 6.6% 78.6% 
PA 1,462 2,502 1,040 71.1% 5,046,442 5,180,805 134,363 2.7% 68.5% 
OR 785 1,348 563 71.7% 1,329,235 1,396,563 67,328 5.1% 66.7% 
WA 797 1,366 569 71.4% 2,185,658 2,444,098 258,440 11.8% 59.6% 
GA 2,733 4,282 1,550 56.7% 3,381,244 3,458,050 76,806 2.3% 54.4% 
NY 12,550 19,412 6,862 54.7% 7,234,915 7,688,492 453,577 6.3% 48.4% 
MD 1,165 1,511 346 29.7% 2,062,515 2,182,260 119,745 5.8% 23.9% 
MA 1,212 1,425 213 17.6% 3,023,126 3,062,689 39,563 1.3% 16.3% 
TX 2,472 3,219 747 30.2% 7,993,559 9,663,567 1,670,008 20.9% 9.3% 
FL 3,552 4,144 592 16.7% 6,366,964 7,134,644 767,680 12.1% 4.6% 
IL 3,435 3,376 -59 -1.7% 5,224,293 5,209,070 -15,223 -0.3% -1.4% 
MN 1,165 1,112 -53 -4.5% 2,359,593 2,518,268 158,675 6.7% -11.3% 
MI 1,433 1,137 -296 -20.7% 3,889,825 3,535,685 -354,140 -9.1% -11.6% 
AZ 507 492 -15 -3.0% 1,945,472 2,173,205 227,733 11.7% -14.7% 
CO 1,290 1,173 -117 -9.1% 1,912,152 2,090,975 178,823 9.4% -18.4% 
IA 319 263 -56 -17.6% 1,229,609 1,305,216 75,607 6.1% -23.7% 
NJ 2,148 1,432 -716 -33.3% 3,596,919 3,492,216 -104,703 -2.9% -30.4% 
TN 1,672 1,128 -544 -32.5% 2,291,504 2,394,068 102,564 4.5% -37.0% 
OK 402 260 -142 -35.3% 1,200,477 1,325,927 125,450 10.5% -45.8% 
U.S. 119,323 194,271 74,948 62.8% 112,400,654 118,266,253 5,865,599 5.2% 57.6% 
Source: County Business Patterns  
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Table 3.5 Establishment Growth by State, 2002-2013 
 Motion Picture Establishments Growth All Establishments Growth Growth 
Difference ST 2002 2013 Net Growth 2002 2013 Net Growth 
UT 143 177 34 23.8% 58,788 71,887 -13,099 22.3% 267.5% 
NC 192 251 59 30.7% 207,562 218,285 -10,723 5.2% 103.5% 
CA 5,627 6,658 1,031 18.3% 820,997 874,243 -53,246 6.5% 90.6% 
LA 67 117 50 74.6% 101,885 104,375 -2,490 2.4% 78.6% 
PA 273 304 31 11.4% 297,257 297,692 -435 0.1% 68.5% 
OR 126 172 46 36.5% 101,933 108,527 -6,594 6.5% 66.7% 
WA 211 274 63 29.9% 165,933 176,815 -10,882 6.6% 59.6% 
GA 290 419 129 44.5% 206,323 217,559 -11,236 5.4% 54.4% 
NY 1,940 2,414 474 24.4% 498,921 532,669 -33,748 6.8% 48.4% 
MD 214 210 -4 -1.9% 131,815 135,421 -3,606 2.7% 23.9% 
MA 251 287 36 14.3% 175,991 172,533 3,458 -2.0% 16.3% 
TX 492 571 79 16.1% 482,169 547,190 -65,021 13.5% 9.3% 
AZ 136 161 25 18.4% 119,740 132,762 -13,022 10.9% 7.5% 
FL 770 929 159 20.6% 450,188 510,389 -60,201 13.4% 4.6% 
IL 491 530 39 7.9% 309,980 315,364 -5,384 1.7% -1.4% 
MN 222 233 11 5.0% 143,953 146,354 -2,401 1.7% -11.3% 
MI 259 228 -31 -12.0% 237,616 217,494 20,122 -8.5% -11.6% 
CO 240 283 43 17.9% 142,247 154,875 -12,628 8.9% -18.4% 
IA 50 54 4 8.0% 81,042 80,581 461 -0.6% -23.7% 
NJ 303 303 0 0.0% 237,505 230,281 7,224 -3.0% -30.4% 
TN 158 171 13 8.2% 130,556 130,819 -263 0.2% -37.0% 
OK 72 89 17 23.6% 86,029 91,717 -5,688 6.6% -45.8% 
U.S. 14,454 16,792 2,338 62.8% 7,200,770 7,488,353 -287,583 62.8% 57.6% 
Source: County Business Patterns 
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Source: County Business Patterns 
Figure 3.2 Motion Picture Employment (Except CA & NY), 2002-2013 
 
It is worth noting that the numbers for the period do not reflect changes on an annual basis. 
In this case, the latter part of this period, from 2008-2013, saw the “Great Recession” and its 
relatively slow recovery (Figure 3.3). However, while some states like Florida, Texas and Georgia 
saw a large dip in employment during this time, most states were relatively flat before the recovery. 
And while there appears to be precipitous drops in 2006 for Illinois, Massachusetts and Washington, 
these are merely points at which data was either estimated, or unable to be estimated based on the 
County Business Patterns. 
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incentives showed positive growth in film industry employment, and 13 states grew film 
employment faster than other industries in their states, only seven had motion picture industry 
growth at a faster rate than the US as a whole. Film industry establishments (Table 3.5) fared a bit 
better, with again 16 states showing growth, and 13 states showing growth greater than other all 
industries, and 12 states beating out film establishment growth nationally. It may also be worth 
noting that the employment growth numbers were more widely distributed, with a high of 290% for 
Utah and a low of -35% for Oklahoma, while Oregon showed the greatest growth in film 
establishments at 23.6% and Michigan the least at -6.1%. 
 
 
 
Source: IPUMS ACS 1% Sample 
Figure 3.3 Motion Picture Occupations (Except CA & NY), 2002-2013 
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I also looked at four film occupations: actors, producers and directors, broadcast and sound 
engineers, and camera operators and editors. While the overall trend is largely rising, this trend does 
not seem to reflect the rise in MPIs, especially in key states like Louisiana and North Carolina, 
though Florida, Texas and Georgia saw notable growth in the last two to three years of this period 
(Figure 3.4). 
3.5.2.2 Panel data regression models 
Before finalizing my panel data regression models, I wanted to eliminate as much as possible 
concerns about multicollinearity. My first step was to run correlation tables all the variables. The 
only correlation coefficient over 0.8 was Highest Point and Elevation Span, so I dropped the Highest 
Point from the fixed effects regression models (See Table 3.7). Also dropped were variables for 
maximum and minimum temperature, which were highly correlated with average temperature. 
3.5.2.2.1 Panel-data fixed-effect estimations for employment models 
First, I looked at three different measures of the effects on employment in the motion picture 
industry: a log-transformed employment variable, the growth in motion picture industry employment 
and the location quotient for the industry in each state and period. For the independent variables, I 
used a dummy variable for MPIs (since MPI levels rarely change, and are all within a fairly narrow 
range of values), lagged by one year; the number of years MPIs have been in effect, not including 
the current year; and the overall employment growth for the state. For each of these three dependent 
variables I ran three different models: models (1), (4) and (7) with only the lagged MPI, (2), (5) and 
(8) with only the number of previous years the MPI was in effect, and (3), (6) and (9) with both. All 
models also included overall state employment growth as a control variable. As can be seen in Table 
3.7, the lagged MPI variable was only significant in one model. The only model in which the lagged 
MPI was significant was (1), showing that an MPI would increase employment by 15 percent. Also, 
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model (2) suggested that employment would increase by three percent for each year the MPI was in 
effect. However, neither of these effects were significant when both variables were included in the 
model (3), nor were they significant alone or together for the other two employment-based 
dependent variables. The only other significant relationship in this set of models was that of state 
employment growth with state motion picture employment growth. Models (4), (5) and (6) indicate 
that motion picture employment grew at over four times the rate of all employment (417 percent, 
461 percent, and 421 percent respectively). I suspect that, while this relationship may hold true in 
general, it was only revealed in this model because of the scale of variables were the same, with both 
being growth percentages. Finally, it is notable that none of the independent variables showed any 
significant effect on the motion picture employment location quotient for each state. This suggests 
that while employment may increase with MPIs, especially after they have been in effect for 
multiple years, that there is little evidence of the states gaining a competitive advantage from these 
gains. 
3.5.2.2.2 Fixed-effects models for establishments and occupations 
The picture changed somewhat when I used establishments and occupations instead of 
employment as the dependent variables. In Table 3.8, the years the MPIs were in effect was positive 
and significant in all the models in which it was included, including those with the lagged MPI 
dummy variable [(3) and (6)]. And while the MPI variable was significant when years were not 
included, it was not significant when they were. The coefficients were smaller in these models, with 
MPIs showing an eight percent and 18 percent increase in establishments and workers in film-related 
occupations respectively, while each year in effect was predicted to increase them by one to two 
percent and three to four percent respectively. State employment growth overall was significant for 
establishments, but the coefficients were effectively zero, suggesting very little effect. 
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Because I am using log-transformed dependent variables for employment, establishments and 
occupations, the coefficients have been exponentiated, and therefore represent the percent change of 
the dependent variable for each percent change of the independent variable. For example, in model 
(2) of Table 3.7, the coefficient for the number of years the MPIs were in effect is 1.03, meaning that 
for each year that the MPIs were in effect before the previous year, there will be a three percent 
increase in motion picture employment. This explains why many of the coefficients are 1.00, 
meaning that there is less than a one percent change in the log-transformed dependent variable. 
It is also worth noting that the R-squared values for the standard linear regressions are quite 
low for employment (0.04) and occupations (0.19), and only a bit higher for establishments (0.22 - 
0.32). 
3.5.2.2.3 Random-effects models 
Having seen some effect from MPIs and the number of years they were in effect, I used a 
number of random-effects models to see what other variables may have an impact on film industry 
outcomes. Here I added several factors known to be important to production location decisions from 
the literature. Among these I looked at environmental factors (temperature and rainfall), 
transportation factors (number of non-stop flights, number of flights to Los Angeles, and distance 
from Los Angeles), and geographic factors (elevation, coastal location, and number of large cities). 
As with the fixed effects models, I included variations on the lagged MPI dummy and the number of 
years in effect, using them individually and in combination to gauge the effects of each. 
For employment, as with the fixed-effects models above, the MPIs and the number of years 
they were in effect were significant by themselves, but not together, with the same coefficients for 
each (1.15 and 1.03 respectively). Also of note were average temperature, though this had a negative 
effect (for each degree, employment declined by six percent); and the number of non-stop flights 
available at the state’s major airport(s). In the case of non-stop flights, the effect was negligible, if 
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significant, with less than one percent change in employment for each flight. This is probably due to 
the scale issue, which might suggest the need to transform the variable to a more comparable scale to 
employment. The significance and coefficients of these two variables was consistent across all nine 
models for employment, establishments and occupations. 
Distance had an impact in one of the establishment models (6), showing that for every 500-
mile distance segment from Los Angeles, there was a 23 percent increase in film employment. This 
is somewhat counterintuitive, but may be explained by the bi-coastal nature of film employment. 
As with employments, both establishments and occupations had similar results in the random 
effects model, with even more of the lagged MPI dummy variables being significant, both alone and 
in combination with the years in effect. These are the strongest evidence yet for impacts of MPIs and 
their years in effect being significant factors in growing the local industry; especially since 
establishments are especially tied to the local geography. 
3.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Based on the findings presented here, there is relatively strong evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that a positive correlation between the existence of and persistence of movie production 
incentives and growth in the local film industry. While the descriptive statistics failed to show a 
strong relationship between MPIs and either film industry employment levels, the number of 
establishments, or the number of people working in film-related occupations, the linear regression 
models told a different story. And while the strength of lagged variables shows some evidence for a 
path-dependence argument, suggesting that growth in the industry is largely dependent on the 
previous levels of film industry activity, the panel data tell a different story. This may be due to the 
effects of the 2008 recession on some of the larger filmmaking states, because the panel data allows 
analysis of year-to-year data, rather than cross-sectional data at the beginning and end of the period. 
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In addition, other factors such as climate, geography and accessibility to the primary film industry 
hub in Los Angeles also seem to play a part in determining growth. 
To review, my research questions going in were the following: 
H1: The number of film industry firms, employees and occupations in each state is positively 
correlated with the existence of tax credits. 
The evidence as presented above seems to largely support this hypothesis. 
 
H2: The persistence of these subsidies over the years contributes to the employment, firm and 
occupational outcomes. 
Again, the evidence as presented above seems to largely support this hypothesis. 
 
H3: MPIs and their persistence contributes to the growth of film industry employment, firms and 
occupations. 
And yet again, the evidence as presented above seems to largely support this hypothesis. 
 
H4: MPIs and their persistence increase the relative concentration of film industry employment 
(location quotient) in the state. 
This is the only hypothesis that does not seem to be supported by the evidence here. 
 
This does not in itself prove or disprove that the other primary rationale for such incentives—
the economic effects of footloose production in the short-term—might in fact justify such tax 
expenditures, though several state studies have suggested otherwise7. Nor does it necessarily prove 
that MPIs, even when sustained over several years, work to build a local industry in all cases. 
Therefore, especially in light of the increasing costs of MPI programs, further evaluation of these 
subsidies should be done, and policymakers should in general consider implementing means by 
which more benefits can be achieved, and to reduce the dependence on the policy. At the very least, 
                                                 
7 See Chapter 2, Previous studies: fiscal & economic impact analyses, for details. 
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there should be more transparency in the implementation and administration of such programs in 
order to avoid the corruption and/or just poor outcomes in the future. 
3.6.1 Recent updates 
Data since 2013 may help us understand the long-term implications of MPI policies. 
FilmL.A. has done a series of studies (McDonald, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017) over the past few years 
that suggest there is more to the story; or in Hollywood terminology, a twist ending. Four states 
emerge as key characters in this story: California, Georgia, Louisiana and North Carolina. These 
studies are limited, as they only look at the top 100 or so feature films by box office sales produced 
anywhere in the world, but they may offer some insight.  
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Source: FilmL.A. 2016 Feature Film Study 
Figure 3.4 U.S. Feature Film Locations, Top 100 Films 
0
5
10
15
20
25
2013 2014 2015 2016
Georgia California Louisiana New York MassachusettsNew Mexico Florida Michigan Pennsylvania
  58 
 
Source: FilmL.A. 2016 Pilot Production Report 
Figure 3.5 Pilot Production Locations (Not Including Los Angeles) 
 
3.6.1.1 What we can see in four states 
Among the states highlighted in the FilmL.A. reports, four states emerge as notable. First, 
California, as the first and still reigning leader of the film and television business, has seen its 
dominance degraded over the last several years, especially among the feature film “blockbusters.” 
After reaching the high of 21 of the top 100 films in 2014, California has dropped to second place 
over the last couple of years. The new leader? Georgia, which has been gaining in recent years. Even 
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Georgia, which is covered in depth in Chapter 4, is especially notable in the last few years. 
As could be seen in the data from IMDb Pro, productions have increased, but employment levels 
have mostly only returned to those of the pre-MPI era. This started to change dramatically in the last 
few years, as the number of top box office features and pilots has increased. Employment nearly 
doubled between 2012 and 2013. And while there was a drop-off in 2014, 2015 showed strong 
growth again8. Figure 3.5 shows that Georgia has also been gaining in television pilots, especially at 
the expense of Louisiana. 
Louisiana may be the best example of the importance of persistence. Beginning in 2002 
(after a number of years of other efforts to attract filmmakers), the state’s generous incentives have 
helped to grow an industry nearly from the ground up. Lacking many of the natural and 
infrastructural advantages of Georgia and other neighbors, nevertheless Louisiana made a great 
effort to build not only the production base, but also to invest in the infrastructure to support it. 
North Carolina does not get a lot of attention in the FilmL.A. reports, but it is important in a 
different way. Known for decades as “Hollywood East,” with the largest studio between California 
and New York, North Carolina began to see productions move to Louisiana after 2002, and 
struggled to maintain its status for several years before and after starting their own more modest MPI 
program. It wasn’t until their incentive rose from 15 to 25 percent in 2011 that they began to see 
results. But the real lesson of North Carolina may be more recent, and the reason they don’t receive 
the notoriety of Georgia and Louisiana. After all, but eliminating the program in 2014, there was a 
virtual exodus of film production from the state; even before the business-killing effects of the 
state’s now infamous HB-2 was conceived (though that has not helped). The new governor, elected 
in 2016, has pledged to bring back the MPI program, and hopefully, film production jobs with it. 
                                                 
8 From author’s calculations from County Business Patterns. 
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3.6.2 Focus on a single state 
One way to move this research forward is too look more closely the year-to-year data. As my 
research continues, I plan to use a variety of time-series and panel data analyses to do just that. In the 
following chapter, I plan to do a detailed analysis of one state, Georgia, where incentives have been 
in place for several years, and where state officials feel the policy has been successful in growing an 
indigenous motion picture industry; a conclusion in alignment with that of the recent FilmL.A. 
studies discussed above. 
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CHAPTER 4 EMBEDDEDNESS AND ITS IMPACT ON LOCAL 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
THE CASE OF THE GEORGIA FILM INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Much attention has been given to the attraction of film and other entertainment industries as a 
means to local economic development. To this end, policymakers at the state and local level have 
used traditional and non-traditional attraction strategies, including most significantly, tax credits and 
other financial incentives. 
The theoretical basis for these attraction strategies brings together components of several 
traditional and more contemporary theories of regional economic development: location theories 
(comprised themselves of growth-pole and cumulative causation theories), the product-cycle theory, 
and entrepreneurship theories (Blakely & Leigh, 2009; Malizia & Feser, 1999). The cumulative 
causation and entrepreneurship explain how regions can gain a competitive advantage in economic 
development, while the growth-pole and product-cycle theories focus on the specific industries 
targeted. The competitive advantage in this case derives from combining an entrepreneurial 
environment with increased agglomeration within the industry sector.9 Entertainment industries are 
targeted here because they are growing industries with innovative products. I will focus here on only 
the theories related to regional advantage. 
Therefore, these theories conclude, attracting entertainment industries will lead to long-term 
employment growth. One challenge unique to these industries is the mobile nature of film and 
                                                 
9 For a more detailed explication of these theories, see Malizia & Feser (1999) and Blakely & Leigh (2009, pp. 76-98) 
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entertainment production. This mobility leads to both short-term projects spending and fierce 
competition between state and municipal entities. One theory as to why financial incentives work 
despite this mobility is that local networks of qualified workers are built up over time, and become 
an attracting force for more production (Christopherson & Rightor, 2010). These local networks 
attract production in two ways: by offering mobile productions a qualified, stable crew base that 
doesn’t need to be imported to the production site, and by creating contacts leading to bringing and 
basing production in the area. 
I test these theories by analyzing data from the IMDb Pro database, supplemented by the 
2012 Georgia Film, Video & Digital Entertainment Sourcebook (Georgia Department of Economic 
Development, 2010), cross-checking it with the Covered Employment Where Wages (CEW) data, 
the CBP establishment data and Oz Magazine’s “Creative Index 2011-2012” 10, (Powell & Powell, 
2011) to measure the number of films, firms, and individuals comprising the state’s motion picture 
industry. The results may suggest whether the hypothesis of attracting mobile productions to 
generate long-term employment in a region has some validity, at least in Georgia. 
In fact, a decade after adopting their first MPI in 2005, Georgia has become one of the top six 
production locations in the world, along with California, Canada, the U.K., New York and Louisiana 
(McDonald, 2016). Six of the world’s top grossing films of 2015 were produced primarily in the 
state, more than any location other than the U.K., and it had the fourth largest production spend that 
same year. 
                                                 
10 The 2012 Georgia Film, Video & Digital Entertainment Sourcebook will henceforth be referred to simply as the 
“Sourcebook,” and the “Creative Index 2011-2012” simply as the “Creative Index.” 
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4.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
So, given what we know about the film and new media industries, what might make Georgia 
competitive in this mobile, project-based industry? After over 10 years of subsidies, most of them 
since the 2008 increase, I look at the established networks of firms and workers currently operating 
in the state to gauge the likelihood of sustainable growth for Georgia. More specifically, I 
investigated the number of Georgia-based employees and establishments, and map the size and 
geography of the industry over an 11-year period from 2002-2012. 
More specifically, I consider three overarching questions regarding the film industry in 
Georgia. First, what does the Georgia film industry network look like? I have attempted to get a 
sense of the scale, connectedness, and geography of the industry in the state. Second, does the 
Georgia film industry possess the “critical components” for a sustainable industry, or is it likely to in 
the near future? By assessing the size and geography of the industry network in the state, I hope to 
answer these questions using Christopherson and Rightor’s criteria. And finally, I will address the 
question of the role of public policy in building and sustaining the film industry. More specifically, 
can tax incentives build a self-sustainable film industry that can remain competitive even when the 
incentives are removed? 
My research focuses on four questions:  
1. Will a steady growth in the number of productions, and direct local employment, 
establishments and occupations, create a sustainable film industry in Georgia? 
2. Does the Georgia film industry have a network of organizations and individuals 
geographically clustered in one or more regions of the state?11 
3. Does the size and geographic proximity of a firm network create spillover effects even for 
non-participating organizations; i.e., does proximity matter? 
4. Do the critical components required for a sustainable local industry exist in Georgia? 
 
                                                 
11 Question 2 is loosely adapted from Uzzi (1996, pp. 345-346) 
  64 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
I use a combination of data from the previously collected data on employment and firm 
growth, the MPI Impact Factor developed in the first essay, the Covered Employment Where Wages 
(CEW) data, and the IMDb Pro database of films and film-related companies and individuals, and 
the Georgia Sourcebook directories. 
I had intended to use the IMDb Pro and Sourcebook data to view connections between the 
various actors by film or video project. Because IMDb Pro allows me to view all participants by 
project, I can get a list of individual and company names associated with each project, their location, 
and their role in the production. Theoretically, this could then be cross-checked with the Sourcebook 
and CEW data to confirm location and other information about the participants. 
4.4 Data Sources 
My primary resources for constructing my social network map will be the Covered 
Employment Where Wages (CEW) data, the IMDb Pro database, the 2012 Georgia Film, Video & 
Digital Entertainment Sourcebook (Georgia Department of Economic Development, 2012) and Oz 
Magazine’s “Creative Index 2011-2012” 12 (Powell, Powell, & Harless). The Covered Employment 
Where Wages (CEW) data, formerly known as ES202, provides county-level data at full NAICS 
code detail from 2001 to 2012, with imputations for undisclosed data. The Internet Movie Database 
(IMDb) has a fee-based professional version called IMDb Pro that, among other things, has listings 
for individuals and firms for hire. IMDb Pro has become the de facto industry standard for 
professional contacts since the service began in 2001, claiming to have data on over two million 
movies, television and entertainment programs and over four million cast and crew members 
                                                 
12 The 2012 Georgia Film, Video & Digital Entertainment Sourcebook will henceforth be referred to simply as the 
“Sourcebook,” and the “Creative Index 2011-2012” simply as the “Creative Index.” 
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(IMDb.com, 2012). What I had hoped to be most useful about this service is that, in addition to 
being able to search by location and project, searching by project shows all participants on that 
project, and therefore might have allowed me to make connections between individuals and firms 
who work together over time. As it turned out, this data was not able to be used in this way, because 
first, it was mostly individual credits, where the CEW listed only establishments; and second, I was 
unable to automate neither the process nor the output of these searches to use them in this way. 
The Sourcebook and “Creative Index,” combined with IMDb Pro and the online database of 
the former, provide the most comprehensive listings of individuals and companies in the film and 
digital entertainment industries. Because the Sourcebook is the official publication of the Georgia 
Office of Film, Video and Digital Entertainment, virtually everyone in the industry provides a 
listing. That being said, the printed versions (also available online) are only published annually, and 
therefore may become outdated quickly, but can provide useful information for historical analysis. 
The online database version of the Sourcebook is more up-to-date, but requires specific searches to 
retrieve information, making it a bit more cumbersome to use as a data source. 
Finally, the Sourcebook and “Creative Index” may underreport smaller organizations and 
individuals who may be unwilling or unable to pay the listing fees for inclusion. This is still the best 
data source available, however. Other options could include “Yellow Pages” style telephone 
directories, Internet searches, and personal references. 
In addition to these sources, I will also use the County Business Patterns (CBP) for some 
state- and county-level establishment and employment data. This source is limited mostly because 
getting geographic and/or industry detail is difficult because of undisclosed data. However, I will use 
this data for multi-state analyses, and to cross-check against the other sources. The CBP is currently 
available through 2015, so I could use the more recent data to suggest trends beyond what could be 
shown using the 2012 data available for the other sources. 
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The CBP is the only source available that allowed a comparison across several states for 
several years. For this reason, it was important to impute values for the suppressed values in the data. 
For my purposes, I wanted to use all motion picture industries except those for motion picture 
exhibition (movie theaters and drive-ins). In most cases this could be done by subtracting NAICS 
code 51213 (Motion picture and video exhibition) from four-digit code 5121 (Motion picture and 
video industries), but in some cases one of these values was suppressed. I could estimate these 
suppressed values using a combination of the employment values for NAICS codes 512110 
(Production), 512120 (Distribution), 512191 (Teleproduction and other postproduction services), and 
512199 (Other) with mid-point estimates of data suppression flags for any of these values that were 
suppressed. For these estimates, I calculate and include the variance in the estimate for estimated 
values. 
Finally, I use IPUMS 5% and 1% microdata to look at four film-related occupations. This 
data is self-reported by Georgia residents. This data also includes industry data, but this data is less 
useful, because the definitions are somewhat different than that of the NAICS codes, and it does not 
allow the disaggregation of motion picture production and exhibition employees. 
It is also worth noting two subscription-fee-based data sets I did not use. As I was beginning 
to collect data, I became aware of the possible availability of the National Establishment Time-
Series (NETS) database for the state of Georgia. Upon further exploration, I was informed that the 
data was in the process of being cleaned and normalized, and would not be available when I needed 
it. I also became aware of another potentially useful data set—and the source of the NETS data—the 
Dunn and Bradstreet Million Dollar Database, but ultimately was unable to access this data, though 
it is apparently available through Georgia Institute of Technology. 
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4.4.1 CEW and IMDb Data Issues 
There were several issues with the CEW which ultimately made it difficult to use for its 
originally intended purposes. I had hoped to use this data to both map the geographic clustering of 
the film industry in Georgia, and to link it to the IMDb data, which would theoretically allow the 
mapping of a network of collaborators on various film and video productions. The first issue was the 
lack of good geographic information from the CEW database. Only a few records and quarterly data 
sets had geographic information below the zip code or county level, and many records lacked 
addresses, zip codes, census tract and block information, or geographic coordinates. In the end, I 
chose to use zip codes, and their geographic centroids, as well as counties, to represent establishment 
locations. 
 
Even more problematic was the lack of overlap in the three key data sets, together with the 
limitations of the IMDb database for mapping connections between individuals and establishments 
on various productions. My attempts to manually match records from the CEW to either the IMDb 
or Sourcebook data, a process necessitated by the many correct and incorrect variations of 
establishments’ names, yielded frustratingly low hit rates across data sets. Given the small numbers 
to begin with, a five to ten percent non-random sample of the CEW was not deemed adequate for my 
analysis. In addition, there was no way to easily map the connections between productions. There 
were two reasons for this: the fact that most crew listings were for individuals, not establishments, 
and they required specific online searches. 
 
Another issue was the incomparability of the 2012 CEW data extracts. This set, extracted 
after the previous years’ data, lacked a unique establishment identifier common to the earlier data, 
which limited the opportunity for longitudinal analysis to data prior to 2012. 
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And finally, there seems to be a notable discrepancy between the CEW data and the CBP, 
despite the fact that I chose to use CEW data for March of each year, to coincide with the timing of 
the CBP survey (See Appendix 2). As of now, I have not been able to get a satisfactory explanation 
for this discrepancy, but the following observations are worth noting: 
• The criteria for what constitutes an employee are different for each survey, with the CEW 
data being more specific about employees and the states in which their services are rendered. 
This might have a bigger impact on employment in the motion picture industry, since it often 
involves employment in states different from those of the employer. This discrepancy seems 
to be borne out by the data, as the percentage of the difference is greater for the motion 
picture industry than for employment generally. 
 
• The difference varies dramatically between years and industries. While the difference is quite 
consistent for all employment (11-13% lower for the CBP), it varies between -29% and 82% 
for the motion picture industry; i.e., the CBP is as much as 29% greater than the CEW 
employment and as little as 82% less (or nearly half) that of the CEW employment. 
 
• The discrepancies for the motion picture industry are greatest in the most recent years, 2009-
2011, while in 3 of the 4 differences in the years when estimates were required for the CBP 
(2002-2005) were within the estimate range used for the March CEW, and in 2 of the 4 when 
using quarterly average employment. 
All of this suggests that more research may be needed to understand these discrepancies, but 
my best guess is that the rules for the different surveys have tended to enlarge the film industry 
employment since 2009 in the CEW data, making comparisons between states difficult. The key 
question may be, which of the two estimates better reflects the impact of film industry employment 
on the growth and embeddedness of the industry in Georgia? Unfortunately, that is a question that 
cannot be answered in this report. 
It is important to note that all firm level and employment data from the CEW and County 
Business Patterns are based on the establishments’ primary identification as being in film production 
and distribution related industries. This means that not all workers for each establishment will be 
doing film-related jobs, nor will they include all individuals doing jobs related to the film industry, 
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thus these numbers represent the actual financial impact of the motion picture industry on the state, 
rather than the narrower question of the impact on film-production-specific occupations. The 
questions I am attempting to answer here relate to growth and concentrations over time and location. 
 
4.4.2 Secondary Data Sources 
In addition to the primary data collected from the above three sources, I used the following 
secondary sources: 
• U.S. Bureau of the Census, ACS 2012 IPUMS 
• Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) 
• 2017 Reel-Crew Production Directory 
• County Business Patterns (CBP) 
The IPUMS ACS microdata sample was used for some occupational analysis, as was the 
BLS Occupational Employment Statistics (OES). The CBP was primarily used as a check on the 
CEW (see note above), as noted above. 
I had also planned to use some or all of the following secondary sources, but was unable to 
do so. The Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) required access to the confidential microdata, and 
I was unable to get that in a timely fashion for this study. There is some non-confidential data, but 
only at the sector level (2-digit SICs). Another option may have been the use of longitudinal 
microdata from a recently created experimental data set based on the LBD: The Synthetic 
Longitudinal Business Database (SynLBD). Unfortunately, this is still quite limited, only including 
3-digit SIC codes from 1976 – 2000. I also had planned to look at business dynamics, but the Center 
for Economic Studies’ Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) again only included sector-level data (2-
digit SIC). 
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4.4.3 Data Analysis Plan 
The data analysis will use two basic types of analysis. The IMDb Pro data is used to identify 
the production activity and growth. I also had intended to use this data to map the social network that 
comprises the industry, but the inability to combine this data with CEW and Sourcebook data made 
that impossible. The employment and firm location data from the CEW is used to map clusters and 
potential networks of production activity, as well as being used as a check on overall scale and 
growth in employment and number of establishments in both the core industries and support 
services. The Georgia Sourcebook and Reel-Crew Production Directory are used to look at the 
presence of critical components of a sustainable film industry. 
This analysis will answer the three questions which are the basis for the hypotheses: First, 
what is the scale and geography of the industry in the state? Second, does the Georgia film industry 
possess the “critical components” for a sustainable industry. Third, have tax incentives contributed 
to building a self-sustainable film industry that can remain competitive even when the incentives are 
removed? I use a variety of descriptive data and a locational cluster analysis to answer the first two 
questions. The third is difficult to assess, since there is no sign of the MPI going away any time 
soon. 
4.5 Findings 
4.5.1 The Scope and Scale of the Georgia Film Industry 
First, the scope, scale and distribution of the film industry in Georgia should be established. I 
will do this using production activity, Georgia film occupations from the IPUMS ACS microdata, 
and employment and establishment data from the CEW. 
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4.5.1.1 Film Production Activity in Georgia 
The first measure of the effectiveness of film tax incentives is the quantity and growth of film 
and television productions in Georgia. Based on location searches in IMDb Pro, the number of 
productions by production release year has grown steadily for overall productions and for feature 
films. The growth rate for feature films, however, especially those with budgets over $500,000—the 
minimum qualifying budget for spending in the state—has been more dramatic than productions as a 
whole. Given the longer period of time between feature film production and release time, the lag is 
understandable. Television production has increased more recently, showing strong growth in 2012 
and 2013 in particular. The difference between the growth in feature films, and more recently in 
television production, and that for other types of productions, is likely the direct result of state 
incentives. 
Maybe more interesting, while films with budgets over $500,000 have grown over 500%, 
films that do not qualify for the state incentive grew by nearly 700%, suggesting that the growth is 
not only due to the transferable tax break. 
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Source: IMDb Pro 
Figure 4.1 Georgia Feature Film Productions by Year, 2000-2013 
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Source: IMDb Pro 
Figure 4.2 Georgia Feature Film Productions by Year, 2000-2013 
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4.5.1.2 Selected Film Occupations 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 IPUMS 5% Sample and ACS 2012 IPUMS 
Figure 4.3 Selected Film & Video Occupations, 2002-13 
 
 
First I look at occupations from the ACS microdata for several key film- and video-related 
occupations for Georgia.13 Figure 4.3. shows selected occupations for 2000 and 2013. These figures 
show how overall, growth in these occupations was inconsistent before the post-recession period of 
2010-2013. During that period, all but one of the occupations showed growth, with only broadcast 
sound engineers declining or showing slower growth. This may be a function of the movement from 
                                                 
13 I based the selected occupations used in previous work by Christopherson et al. (2006) 
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live broadcasting, typified by organizations such as Turner Broadcasting, to more recorded film and 
video production. 
 
 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) 
Figure 4.4 Georgia Selected “Below-the-Line” Occupations for Four Years Between 2000-2012 
 
 
In addition to looking at occupations from the ACS, I used the BLS OES data to study 
employment by occupation for several key film- and video-related occupations for Georgia. Figure 
4.4 shows four common “below-the-line” occupations—typically more technical, non-creative 
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and Video Equipment Technicians did show marked growth over the 12-year period; the growth was 
also steady, except for the year of the “Great Recession.” The recession also may have impacted 
camera operators and audio technicians, but 2008 was apparently a good year for film and video 
editors, although this category did decline again in the following years. 
4.5.1.3 Georgia Film Employment and Establishments by Industry 
Based on a summary of all film industry NAICS codes, industry employment peaked in 
2002, but then grew fairly steadily from 2004 through 2012. The pre-incentive peak may be at least 
in part due to the fact that this is the year other states, most notably Louisiana, began offering tax 
incentives to attract productions. It is especially interesting to note that the largest growth rates took 
place in the years in which tax incentive packages being implemented (2005 and 2008). 
While production jobs have accounted for virtually all jobs and growth, and therefore tracked 
closely to the total, Figure 4.5 shows that they did peak above the 2002 peak in 2012, suggesting a 
shift from non-production to production jobs in the industry mix. During that period, the converse 
was true of the non-production jobs. Teleproduction and Other Postproduction (512191 in Figure 4.6 
declined sharply in 2004, and has been gradually declining since, while Distribution (512120) and 
Other Motion Picture Industries (512199) have been largely flat during the entire period, with the 
former declining bit in 2007 and the later rising a bit at around the same time. It is also worth noting 
that this growth was consistent throughout the 2008 recession and its recovery period, except for a 
slight dip in 2010. 
The findings for establishments were similar to those for employment in some respects, but 
surprising in others. Table 4.7 shows that production establishments declined from 2002 to 2005, 
when the first incentive package was implemented, then a steady rise to a 2009 peak, followed by a 
slight drop in 2010, and a return to slightly surpass 2009 levels in 2012. One might expect less 
variability in the establishment numbers, so this is not terribly surprising, but it is interesting to note 
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the similarities between the trends here and in film production (Figure 4.5), which similarly peaked 
in 2007 before flattening out. Figure 4.8 shows a similar trend for Teleproduction and Other 
Postproduction, while the other categories were more similar to the employment numbers for those 
industries. And as with employment, this growth continued throughout the 2008 recession and its 
recovery period. 
 
 
 
Source: Georgia CEW 
Figure 4.5 Georgia Film & Video Production Employment, 2002-2012 
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Source: Georgia CEW 
Figure 4.6 Georgia Non-Production Film & Video Employment, 2002-2012 
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Source: Georgia CEW 
Figure 4.7 Georgia Film & Video Production Establishments, 2002-2012 
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GA
 E
st
ab
lis
hm
en
ts
Production
  80 
 
Source: Georgia CEW 
Figure 4.8 Georgia Non-Production Film & Video Establishments, 2002-2012 
 
4.5.2 The Geographic Distribution of the Georgia Film Industry 
The geography of the Georgia film industry is broken down by county and zip code. 
4.5.2.1  The Georgia Film Industry Employment by County 
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through the state. Again, this shows a large concentration in the Atlanta metropolitan areas, with 
small concentrations in mostly urban areas near Savannah and a few other smaller cities. 
4.5.2.2 The Georgia Film Industry Employment by Zip Code 
Using the address in the Georgia CEW, I was also able to further drill down into this 
geographic concentration. Table 4.4 shows the top 20 zip codes by film employment. Similar to the 
employment by county, these 20 zip codes account for over 80 percent of total film employment in 
the state (81.2%), and all but one is not in the Atlanta MSA (30721 in Whitfield County). In fact, the 
top five zip codes contained about 55% of the state’s total. Also, eight of the top ten, accounting for 
nearly 50 percent of the total, are in the city of Atlanta, with the other two in neighboring Decatur 
(DeKalb County) and Norcross (Gwinnett County). So even more than the county data, this indicates 
a high degree of concentration in the film industry. 
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Figure 4.9 Georgia Motion Picture Employment by County, 2002 
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Figure 4.10 Georgia Motion Picture Employment by County, 2012 
 
4.5.3 Critical Components 
As suggested in Chapter 2, and to some degree validated in Chapter 3, specialized 
infrastructure is an important factor in creating and sustaining a state’s film industry. So how does 
Georgia stack up based on Christopherson and Rightor’s six critical components of a sustainable 
film industry. Here they are again: 
• The presence of the industry decision makers (studio executives, producers, etc.), 
• specialized business services such as attorneys, investment bankers, location scouts, and 
agents,  
• smaller service businesses catering to the film industry,  
2012 Film Employment
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• training and education programs in specialized fields,  
• studios and other production, rehearsal, and sound-recording spaces,  
• and the research and development that comes from industry-specific events and programs 
such as trade shows and film festivals (Christopherson & Rightor, 2010, pp. 345-346, 
emphasis added). 
 
Table 4.3 Selected Listings from 2017 Reel-Crew Production Directory 
 GA LA NC MI 
2010 Population 9,687,653 4,533,372 9,535,483 9,883,640 
Crew Category 7,557 a 6,790 4,335 
Producers (Feature & TV) 136 48 189 121 
Directors 97 48 
 
69      
Support Services Category 3,038 a 1,479 2,530 
Sound Stages/Studios 15 14 12 16 
Talent Agencies 15 8 37 18 
Casting Agencies 20 9 17 0 
Entertainment Attorneys (firms) 25 22 20 32 
Craft Services 27 25 32 47      
Total Crew & Services 10,595 2,944 8,269 6,865 
Source: Compiled from the four states’ online Reel-Crew Production Directory 
a. Louisiana's database combines crew & support services, so it was not possible to get a 
breakdown between the two. 
 
 
First, it should be noted that the Georgia film industry ecosystem has become quite rich in 
recent years. In 2012, when I collected the data from that year’s online Sourcebook, there were 
already over 2,200 unique entries under Support Services. A recent check revealed that number is 
now up to well over 3,000 entries, all of which are required to have a Georgia tax ID and street 
address to qualify for entry (Georgia Department of Economic Development, 2017). That does not 
include the over 7,500 individual crew members also listed in that directory. As for specialized 
service business, the site lists everything from Animal Wranglers to Transportation specialists. 
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Table 4.5 shows a comparison of key roles, specialized support services, and studio 
infrastructure across a number of key filmmaking states. I have not included California or New 
York, since they do not offer comparable directories, and the scale is quite different, with states 2-3 
times large than Georgia and its closest competitors. 
Also, the number of film and video education programs has risen dramatically, with the state 
taking a leading role. One statewide effort that is particularly notable is Georgia Film Academy, a 
collaborative effort of the University System of Georgia and Technical College System of Georgia 
(that partners ten four-year and community colleges to provide practical training that includes both 
classroom and on-set learning (Georgia Film Academy, 2017). In addition, private for- and non-
profit institutions such as Savannah College of Art, Emory University and the Art Institute of Atlanta 
have added and/or expanded their offerings in recent years. 
One thing not listed among these attributes is transportation access, though this is frequently 
mentioned as a key reason for Georgia’s success in attracting production. With the busiest airport in 
the world, the cost and convenience of air travel, especially to Southern California and New York, 
make Georgia particularly appealing. Combine this with location offering that include mountains 
and plains, subtropical ocean beaches and northern winters, and a large city, small towns and rural 
areas, all with moderate year-round temperatures, and Georgia becomes even more attractive than 
many competitors. 
However, given the large MPI offered to productions, and the lack of transparency in 
reviewing it, it remains to be seen whether this ecosystem would survive either a reduction or 
removal of the tax incentive, or more aggressive incentives elsewhere. 
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4.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Returning to the theory, and the research questions from which they sprang, what does this 
evidence show? In considering the first question, that growth over several years in key metrics, is 
inconsistent, though some preliminary data show signs of production & employment growth in the 
few after those in the IMDb and CEW data. 
Based on the findings presented here, the evidence suggests a positive correlation between 
implementation and level of movie production incentives and growth in the film industry, especially 
in later years. Using the metrics of productions, employment by industry, and employment by 
occupation, there is evidence to support the hypothesis that the incentives implemented in 2005 and 
expanded in 2008 have had some impact on the growth of the film and video cluster in Georgia. 
It is interesting to note that, though the overall number of Georgia-based productions slowed 
in the years following their earlier peak in 2006, feature films and television series have shown 
especially strong growth since 2010. This phenomenon may be interpreted in more than one way, 
based on earlier studies, large feature films, with their commensurately large budgets, might be more 
likely to base production location based on budgetary considerations such as refundable tax 
incentives. However, they are also more likely to import crew, and to use subcontractors not based in 
the production location. The other big takeaway from the production numbers is the growth of 
smaller films, which may support the cluster theory regarding a sustainable industry. 
At the same time, both film production employment and establishments showed some signs 
growth since the first MPIs were introduced in 2005, which was at a low point at that time.  
In terms of production, Georgia seems to be gaining ground since 2013, according FilmL.A. 
(McDonald, 2017). In their study of the top 100 feature films by box office sales produced anywhere 
in the world, Georgia was number one in 2016, up from number five in 2013, the first year of the 
study (See Table 4.4). Georgia saw steady growth in this study since 2014. 
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Source: FilmL.A. 2016 Feature Film Study 
Figure 4.11 U.S. Feature Film Locations, Top 100 Films (Featuring Georgia) 
 
 
However, motion picture employment tells a somewhat more nuanced story. Based on CBP 
data, film employment more than doubled between 2010 and 2015 (118%). However, the state’s 
location quotient actually dropped between 2013 and 2015, from 0.75 to 0.42, while states like 
California and Louisiana saw theirs grow. Occupations showed less steady growth, but a spike in 
2013 and solid growth in film and video technicians corroborate these findings. 
Questions two and three, that a competitive film industry will be characterized by a network 
of organizations and individuals geographically clustered in one or more regions of a state, and that 
this network will have impact beyond its direct members, also seems to be true in Georgia based on 
0
5
10
15
20
25
2013 2014 2015 2016
Georgia California Louisiana New York MassachusettsNew Mexico Florida Michigan Pennsylvania
  90 
the degree of geographic concentration and the growth of non-MPI-qualifying films, suggesting a 
functional, if not a formal, network cluster and its less-connected beneficiaries. 
And finally, hypothesis four on critical components is supported by evidence of many 
ancillary establishments and activities making up these components. The presence of this 
increasingly established ecosystems of firms, workers and support services make sustainability seem 
more likely. Recent data from the FilmL.A. studies14 bolster this conclusion with data on production 
through 2016, as does the growth in employment since 2013. 
All of this present a somewhat mixed message, with many signs pointing to the benefits of 
MPIs, but others that question their efficacy. 
                                                 
14 See Chapter 3, “Conclusions and Policy Implications,” for more details. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
Tying the two studies together, we can see that in general, MPIs may have a modest effect, 
but that in Georgia specifically, this effect has been exaggerated. At this point, Georgia does benefit 
from some of the things that do seem to matter, however. With ten years of solid growth in film and 
video production, path dependence favors them over many less successful states going forward. In 
addition, other factors such as access to Los Angeles (as measured by time and number of non-stop 
flights). 
5.1.1 Some General Conclusions 
So, given the evidence from both the multistate study, and the case study of Georgia, should 
state policymakers implement and/or double down on MPIs. Returning to the theory may be helpful 
in answering this question. 
First, the literature discussed in Chapter 2 above suggests caution. Economic development 
theory generally cautions against incentives for several reasons, many of which are applicable here. 
The biggest concerns are around state competition leading to rent seeking behavior and a “race to the 
bottom,” while the effects of labor hysteresis are likely to be modest. 
Second, attributes of the motion picture industry suggest that incentives should be even less 
effective based on the lack of permanent physical investment relative to other industry sectors such 
as manufacturing. That said, the networked nature of production projects requires a different kind of 
infrastructure; one which requires a larger ecosystem within which the production functions. In 
addition, some degree of both general (e.g., transportation access) and industry-specific 
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infrastructure (e.g., large film studios) are also important, and can be developed in conjunction with 
public policy decisions. 
5.1.2 Policy Implications 
Combining these observations with the findings in both studies, one might conclude that, 
while MPIs have resulted in positive outcomes in many states, these theory-based caveats should 
give policymakers pause when considering incentives for the film industry. First, there are the fiscal 
and economic studies showing often large net costs, including costs per job created, and that 
opportunity costs might offer the possibility of more effective policies for creating good jobs for 
state workers. Second, few states have ended their MPI programs, and those which have have 
usually seen a dramatic drop in production activities. While this may be fine if the purpose is to 
merely take advantage of the multiplier effect of production spending, this does not bode well for 
building a local film industry. 
All of this suggests caution as policymakers consider implementing, expanding, or in some 
cases, reinstating, their film tax incentives. North Carolina is having this debate now, after 
witnessing losses in production following the major downsizing of its program a two years 
ago.(Handfield, 2014; McHugh & Boardman, 2014) There are certainly always many of voices 
calling for this form of rent-seeking behavior, but any consideration should include a detailed 
analysis of what to expect, and transparency in the programs that are implemented. 
On the other hand, for states who commit to MPIs for long periods, there do seem to be 
payoffs. I would argue, however, that based on what happened with North Carolina, and nearly 
happened to Maryland a couple years ago, these payoffs may be fleeting if the state either lacks other 
key features attractive to filmmakers, or fails to invest in building the infrastructure and ecosystem 
without which producers will merely seek out the best deal (rent-seeking). 
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5.1.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
One possible reason for the outcomes may be the effects of extra-jurisdictional actors. Other 
states have been implementing and altering tax incentive programs of their own, in many cases in 
direct reaction to those of competing states. I saw some evidence of that with the employment drop 
after 2002, when the first states began implementing incentives. A more complex model would be 
needed to assess the competition effects of states’ policies. 
Another way to move this research forward is too look more closely the year-to-year data. As 
my research continues, I plan to use a variety of time-series and panel data analyses to do just that. 
I also found it difficult to assess the motivations of location decisions. I was able to find no 
academic research on film location decisions that didn’t discuss more than the effects of MPIs on 
attraction strategies. Interviews with decision-makers would be a good way answer this question. 
I had also hoped to use social network analysis to assess the networked nature of the 
industry, but between my weakness with the methodology and lack of good network data, this was 
not possible in this dissertation. 
And finally, I plan to continue exploring the components of sustainability by doing some 
comparative study with a few other states with existing industry clusters, most notably California 
and New York. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C.1 Georgia Film Employment by County, 2002-2012 
FIPS County Name 2002 2012 
15 Bartow County 2 12 
19 Berrien County 16 8 
21 Bibb County 6 10 
29 Bryan County 0 3 
43 Candler County 0 17 
47 Catoosa County 4 3 
51 Chatham County 4 10 
57 Cherokee County 7 10 
59 Clarke County 0 5 
67 Cobb County 124 141 
77 Coweta County 1 3 
83 Dade County 1 0 
89 DeKalb County 388 1,070 
95 Dougherty County 0 4 
97 Douglas County 4 0 
111 Fannin County 0 1 
113 Fayette County 2 1 
117 Forsyth County 18 57 
121 Fulton County 1,081 728 
123 Gilmer County 0 1 
127 Glynn County 9 1 
129 Gordon County 1 0 
135 Gwinnett County 94 186 
139 Hall County 0 4 
145 Harris County 0 9 
151 Henry County 4 9 
157 Jackson County 0 2 
175 Laurens County 13 0 
179 Liberty County 0 7 
187 Lumpkin County 1 0 
215 Muscogee County 9 8 
217 Newton County 0 9 
219 Oconee County 3 5 
223 Paulding County 0 3 
245 Richmond County 3 9 
247 Rockdale County 13 2 
255 Spalding County 2 0 
261 Sumter County 0 3 
275 Thomas County 8 0 
277 Tift County 0 1 
285 Troup County 5 0 
291 Union County 0 1 
297 Walton County 2 13 
311 White County 0 1 
313 Whitfield County 0 27 
Source: Georgia CEW 
*Taken using March employment numbers for each year;  
Only included counties with motion picture production employment. 
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